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 This thesis provides an overall analysis of the global toxic waste trade within the 
framework of an international environmental agreement called the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, signed in 1989. 
Up until this treaty, there was no information based trade system for toxic waste. A series of 
highly publicized cases of toxic waste dumping from industrialized countries to developing 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s prompted the need for an organized trade system. Toxic waste 
is a harmful and sometimes lethal substance, and exposure is an especially high risk within 
developing countries who have less resources to establish the safest possible infrastructure to 
process waste.   
 
 Within this thesis, I primarily focus on developing countries because these countries 
generally do not produce toxic wastes and do not possess the infrastructure to safety process it. 
The Basel Convention is largely the result of developing countries lobbying the UNEP to 
establish an international environmental agreement to regulate the toxic waste trade. With 
developing countries as the focus, this thesis follows two general frameworks. Firstly, this thesis 
analyzes the toxic waste trade as an international environmental agreement, which seeks to 
improve state behavior by establishing a transparent system in which states much report where 
they are sending waste, with the consent of countries that import this waste. This framework 
ultimately aims to understand why states fulfill obligations to the agreement by reporting. The 
second framework focuses on which states are importing toxic waste. This thesis theoretically 
and empirically considers how wealth, inequality, democracy, and corruption may help explain 
how both frameworks are operating.  
 
 For my methodology, I draw upon a variety of primary and secondary sources. I analyze 
scholarly literature regarding both conditions that lead to compliance with international 
environmental law and general background information on the Basel Convention, in order to 
understand how effective international environmental agreements are in changing behavior, 
especially in agreements that establish reporting systems. Then I analyze environmental literature 
that explains conditions that lead to environmental degradation to hypothesize which states might 
import toxic waste. Secondly, I analyze empirical information at the state level from both the 
Basel Convention and from a variety of state-level indices that measure wealth, inequality, 
democracy, and corruption. The Basel Convention publishes reports that show how much toxic 
waste a country imports, exports, and details on the type of waste and the destination of the 
waste.  
 
 I find that reports sent to the Basel Convention are inconsistent and inaccurate, especially 
among developing countries. Many countries submit reports to the Basel Convention that are 
missing import information. Some countries write memos that explain their toxic waste imports 
rather than submitting numbers. Accuracy of reporting is questionable because the information 
that countries provide in their import reports does not align with the reports submitted by 
countries that export to them. For example, in a memo China wrote that it forbids imports of 
toxic waste, but other countries report exporting toxic waste to them, which indicates that they 
may be submitting false information.  
 
 In an effort to understand reporting behavior, I consider different characteristics of these 
countries. Some international environmental scholars believe that states intentionally violate 
international environmental agreements in order to promote their own best interests, and other 
scholars suggest that states may not comply with obligations due to a lack of capacity to 
implement new systems. With these considerations in mind, I seek to understand why countries 
either never report or report false information to the Basel Convention.  
 
 My empirical and theoretical analysis of state-level wealth, inequality, democracy and 
corruption suggests that many developing countries are not reporting due to a lack of capacity. I 
find that the poorest and most unequal on average members of the Basel Convention are the least 
likely to report, suggesting that reporting is costly and requires resources that are unavailable to 
developing countries. Countries that are less democratic and more corrupt on average are also 
less likely to report, which may indicate that these countries are not willing to commit resources 
towards establishing a reporting system. Overall, reporting accuracy appears to be more of a 
capacity issue than states intentionally violating the rules.   
  
 In addition to looking at reporting behavior within developing countries, I also consider 
toxic waste imports. Some environmental scholars suggest that developing countries may import 
toxic waste out of economic desperation. Empirical evidence from the Basel Convention refutes 
this suggestion. I find that industrialized countries import the most toxic waste, indicating that 
states that have the capacity to safely process toxic waste are importing the most of it. There is 
no clear relationship between a developing country’s level of wealth and the amount of toxic 
waste that it imports, which suggests that the poorest developing countries are not importing 
toxic waste out of desperation. My findings regarding toxic waste imports are generally 
reassuring, with one exception. The developing countries that do import toxic waste tend to be 
the most corrupt on average, which suggests that corrupt countries may import toxic waste for 
economic gain, while developing countries generally do not.  
 
 My empirical and theoretical findings on the current state of the global toxic waste trade 
hold a few implications for environmental justice and international environmental law. While the 
Basel Convention has improved conditions of the global toxic waste trade overall, issues remain 
within developing countries. I find that many countries are not reporting or reporting accurately, 
and the most corrupt developing countries are importing toxic waste. The Basel Convention must 
provide assistance to implement reporting systems in developing countries to facilitate better 
overall transparency in the global toxic waste trade. Successful and transparent reporting systems 
promote accountability for actions within the toxic waste trade, which then results in safer 
conditions of trade. 
 
 The difficulties that developing countries face in meeting requirements of the Basel 
Convention holds implications more broadly for international environmental law. International 
environmental agreements must be designed with financial limitations and capacity in mind. 
Focusing on the importance of transparency in international environmental law agreements and 
establishing reporting systems that regulate behavior, such as the Basel Convention, feedback 
systems must be in place to assess whether states are upholding obligations, otherwise, states 
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 Each year states globally transport roughly 8 to 10 million metric tons of hazardous waste 
to other countries.1 These harmful compounds reach a final destination, where they often linger 
in the environment and make people sick. Two decades ago, countries around the world gathered 
to ensure that toxic waste would be managed safely, especially within developing nations. The 
agreement they created was the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. States around the world needed an international system 
to keep countries accountable for the waste either leaving or entering their borders. How well is 
this regulatory system facilitating transparency and effective regulation in the global toxic waste 
trade? What influences the ability or willingness of states to live up to the treaty’s provisions? 
Under what conditions do states decide to accept imports of hazardous waste? 
Background information on Basel Convention 
 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal was prompted by highly publicized cases of unsafe and nonconsensual 
waste dumps in developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s. 2 These instances demonstrated the 
need to tighten control among countries exporting and importing toxic waste. In one of these 
cases, nine hundred tons of highly toxic chemical waste from Italy was dumped in Nigeria 
without Nigeria’s consent or knowledge.3 The Nigerian government’s lack of awareness of the 
                                                1	  Invernizzi, M., Mauri, M., Baggi, G., & McKay, Z.  (2016) "Toxic waste routes." Density Design. Web. 
2 Chasek, P. (2001). “Eleven cases of multilateral environmental negotiation.” Earth Negotiations: 
Analyzing thirty years of environmental Diplomacy. New York:United Nations University Press.  
111. 
3 Gbadegesin, S. (2001). “Multinational Corporations, Developed Nations, and Environmental Racism: 
Toxic Waste, Exploration, and Eco-Catastrophe.” In Faces of Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues 
of Global Injustice. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  
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entry of a toxic substance across its borders exemplifies the lack of transparency in the 
international toxic waste trade at the time. The Basel Convention sought to establish 
transparency within the international toxic waste trade by establishing a monitoring system that 
would prevent unsafe societal and environmental conditions that stemmed from a lack of 
accountability among countries. 4   
 In 1981, the legal department of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
agreed to address disparities within the hazardous waste trade, as well as a lack of  control over 
trade. 5 UNEP formed a working group to set guidelines on the environmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes. This working group developed the Cairo Guidelines, two main 
principles agreed upon to set standards for the toxic waste trade. The first principle focused on 
transparency of the trade through prior informed consent of the state receiving toxic waste, and 
the second principle focused on ensuring that states do not send toxic waste to states that cannot 
process toxic waste as well as the exporting state.6 Both of these principles aimed to reduce 
unwanted transport of waste from industrialized countries to developing countries.     
 After the working group developed these guidelines, environmental NGOs teamed up 
with developing countries, working especially with African states, to lobby UNEP to negotiate 
an international agreement.7 In 1987 UNEP was authorized to form a Working Group of Legal 
and Technical Experts, whose purpose was to form a global convention on the international toxic 
waste trade, particularly focusing on transparency within the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes. 8  UNEP drafted an agreement, encompassing principles developed by the 
                                                
4 Chasek, 116. 
5 Chasek, 110. 
6 Chasek, 111. 7	  Chasek, 111. 	  
8 Gbadegesin, 187. 
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Cairo guidelines. 9 In Geneva in 1988, experts from thirty-three countries gathered to discuss the 
principle of prior informed consent. Developing countries strongly advocated for the importance 
of this principle to be included in the text of the convention. 10 Part of establishing transparency 
in the toxic waste trade was agreeing on technicalities, such as establishing the safest methods to 
manage toxic waste and determining what characteristics qualify a substance as a toxic waste. 
Later that year, forty government representatives met in Caracas and agreed to define hazardous 
waste on a list of categories and characteristics, which the OECD had formerly developed. 
Delegates agreed to include the principle of prior informed consent in the convention and to form 
a process to facilitate the implementation of the convention.11  
 In March of 1989, delegates from 116 countries convened for a final session of 
negotiations in Basel, Switzerland.12 The decisions resulting from these negotiations were all 
formally implemented as part of The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, more commonly known as the Basel 
Convention. The convention primarily aimed to avoid the transfer of improperly identified or 
inappropriate hazardous wastes to developing countries by pinpointing sources and destinations 
of toxic waste.13 States exporting toxic waste must provide information to the convention’s 
secretariat on the effects of the movement of wastes on human health and the environment.14 
They must ensure that authorized personnel manage any waste transported or disposed of within 
its national jurisdiction. Any waste must be packaged and labeled along with a movement 
                                                
9 Chasek, 112. 
10 Chasek, 113. 
11 Chasek, 113. 
12 Chasek, 114. 
13 Chasek, 110. 
14 The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their 
Disposal, 1989. Article IV, 2f-h.  
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document.15  Before exporting toxic waste, states must notify states destined for disposal or 
transport with detailed information of the waste and receive written consent before shipping 
toxic waste.16 In order to establish a more transparent international waste trade, The Basel 
Convention established a reporting system that requires parties to record imports and exports of 
toxic wastes.17 They submit reports to the secretariat, which compiles the information. The 
ultimate goal is to limit traffic harmful or inappropriate transfers of waste from industrialized 
countries to developing countries.18  
 In order to address disparities within the toxic waste trade, the Convention promotes 
transferring environmentally sound technology for the safe management of toxic waste to those 
in need of “technical assistance,”19 understanding that developing countries have less resources 
and infrastructure to safely manage hazardous waste.20 It specifically aims to protect developing 
countries from unwanted toxic waste imports by requiring exporting parties to inform the state of 
import and wait to receive written consent before exporting toxic waste.21 Delegates of 
developing countries persistently promoted this aspect of the Convention throughout 
negotiations, threatening to block any convention that did not “give them the right to disapprove 
the import or transshipment of wastes through their territory.”22 The secretariat also provides 
assistance to parties for environmentally sound management of toxic wastes.23  
 Despite the strong role of African states in the negotiations leading to the amendments of 
the Basel Convention, not all African states were confident that the final draft of the Basel 
                                                
15 The Basel Convention, Article IV, 7a-c.   
16 The Basel Convention, Article V, 1-2.  
17 Chasek, 116. 
18 The Basel Convention, Article XVI 1b-c.  
19 The Basel Convention, Article X 2d.  
20 The Basel Convention, Preamble.  
21 The Basel Convention, Article IV 1a-c.  
22 Chasek, 113. 
23 The Basel Convention, Article XVI 1-3. Chasek, 116. 
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Convention would protect them from unwanted toxic waste.24 These states felt that the Basel 
Convention did not go far enough to prevent industrialized countries from dumping toxic waste 
within their borders.25 These states therefore negotiated the Bamako Convention on the ban on 
the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of 
Hazardous Wastes within Africa in 1991. The Bamako Convention bans the import of any 
hazardous wastes in African countries. Therefore, I expect that Bamako Convention parties 
should not import toxic waste. In Chapter 2, evidence suggests that this is generally the case.  
 Unlike the Bamako Convention, the Basel Convention lacks a formal system in which 
states may ban imports, even though efforts have been made to include it. In 1994 
representatives gathered at the second meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel 
Convention and agreed to ban the export of toxic waste destined for final disposal from OECD 
(industrialized) to non-OECD (developing) states. This decision was not in the text of the 
Convention, so parties proposed to make this decision an amendment in 1995 for it to be legally 
binding.26 For an amendment to enter into force, three-fourths of the parties present at the time of 
the adoption of the amendment must ratify it.27 Following this rule, 62 ratifications are needed 
for the ban amendment to enter into force because that is three quarters of the number of parties 
present in 1995.28  
 Despite receiving more than 62 ratifications, the Basel ban amendment has not entered 
into force. Differences in interpretation of Article 17 have delayed the implementation of the ban 
amendment. The United States, Australia, and Canada have been at the forefront of lobbying 
                                                
24 Chasek, 115. 
25 Chasek, 114. 
26 Chasek, 115. 
27 The Basel Convention, Article XVII 3.  
28 “The Basel Ban Amendment: Entry Into Force Now!” (2006). BAN: Basel Action Network. Briefing 
Paper 4. Web. 
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against the ban amendment. 29 Although 62 ratifications meet the three quarters requirement at 
the time of the adoption of the amendment, these industrialized states have argued that the 
number of ratifications should depend on the current list of 168 parties.30  This interpretation 
requires more ratifications and has already delayed implementation of the Basel ban amendment 
to up to twenty years. 31 Many states refuse to ratify the ban amendment, reflecting their desire to 
export economic externalities of industrial production to poorer countries.32 
 While some states have refused to ratify the ban amendment, the United States has failed 
to implement the Basel Convention altogether. The United States was one of the first signatories 
of the Basel Convention, but it has not ratified the convention and is therefore not a member.33 
As one of the leading toxic waste producers in the world, the United States’ membership in the 
Convention would make a substantial impact on the global toxic waste trade.34 The success of 
the Basel Convention depends on the participation of industrialized states that produce the most 
toxic waste. The Unites States has the most financial resources to contribute to technical 
assistance and technology exchange with developing countries. The Basel Convention influences 
trade between the United States and members of the Basel Convention; waste can only be traded 
between these two groups with pre-determined agreements.35 The Convention is thus influential, 
but because the United States is not a member it is not bound by the rules of The Basel 
Convention.  
                                                
29 BAN. (2006).  
30 BAN. 2006.  
31 BAN. 2006.  
32 BAN. 2006.  
33 “Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal.” (N.d.) Basel Secretariat Website. Web. 
34 Kirby, R. (1994). “The Basel Convention and the Need for United States Implementation.” The 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Inc, 24.  
35  “International Agreements on Transboundary Shipments of Waste.” (N.d). Environmental Protection 
Agency. Web.   
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 While the Basel Convention has “been central to eliminating some of the worst forms of 
‘toxic dumping’ by industrialized countries on developing countries,”36 several issues remain for 
developing countries in the context of the Basel Convention. Developing countries lack 
infrastructural capacity to manage waste in an environmentally sound manner and advocated for 
technical assistance during negotiations of the Convention. While Articles 10, 13, and 16 
promote technical assistance to developing countries, resources within the secretariat are limited 
to follow up with these provisions, especially amid widespread need from developing 
countries.37 Developing countries also lack the technical capacity to monitor illegal traffic of 
toxic wastes, which leaves them particularly vulnerable to illegal toxic waste dumping. While 
illegal trafficking of toxic waste is impossible to monitor, a known concern for developing 
countries is a lack of resources to properly deal with the discovery of illegal toxic waste.38 The 
Convention does not state any form of compensation or reparation in the occurrence of illegal 
dumping. 39   
 Within the framework of understanding the Basel Convention as a system of establishing 
transparency in the international toxic waste trade and the known shortcomings in protecting 
developing countries, I investigate the current state of reporting behavior within the Basel 
Convention to assess its success at establishing transparency to prevent harmful trade of toxic 
waste and to examine the conditions that allow for, or prevent its successes. I will examine the 
conditions under which states comply with the reporting requirements of the Basel Convention. 
In addition, because I am already examining reports of imports, I have the opportunity to also 
examine the amounts of wastes that are traded. This too will allow me to understand under what 
                                                
36 Krueger, J. (1999). International Trade and the Basel Convention. University of California: Earthscan. 
117.  
37 Krueger, 87.  
38 Krueger, 89.  
39 Krueger, 89.  
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contexts states import toxic waste, and whether these conditions promote or hinder the safest 
possible toxic waste disposal.  
Transparency and Compliance in International Environmental Agreements 
 
 Environmental degradation often crosses international boundaries, thus international 
cooperation is essential to address global environmental issues.40 This global coordination often 
takes the form of international environmental agreements, such as the Basel Convention. 
International environmental agreements often establish and facilitate systems that promote 
transparency, defined as “fostering the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of regular, 
prompt, and accurate regime-relevant information.”41 Transparency can create an incentive for 
states to change their behavior by publishing information on the activities that the agreement 
seeks to regulate, which is called “compliance-oriented transparency.”42 Analysts may also use 
this information to assess whether the international convention is achieving its goals, which is 
“effectiveness-oriented transparency.”43 Politically, it is easier to collect information that 
assesses how well the convention is doing as a whole rather than to collect information that will 
identify actors that are failing to meet convention requirements.44  
 Self-reporting, in which states provide information on their own behavior, is the most 
common form that information is supplied in regimes because it is the most “politically 
palatable” and is the most economic form of information gathering. 45 Ronald Mitchell proposed 
four types of self-reporting actors in international environmental conventions. First, there are 
                                                
40 DeSombre, E. (2014). “Global Environmental Governance.” In International Organization and Global 
Governance. Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds. London: Routledge.  
41 Mitchell, R. (1998). “Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes.” 
International Studies Quarterly, 42.109.  
42 Mitchell. 113. 
43 Mitchell, 113. Sands, P. “Enforcing Environmental Security: The Challenges of Compliance with 
International Obligations.” Journal of International Affairs. (1993). Vol. 46.  
44 Mitchell. 113.  
45 Mitchell. 116. 
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“committed conformers” who both support regime norms and their behavior conforms to the 
regime norms. Secondly, there can be “good faith non-conformers” whose behavior fails to 
conform to regime norms despite being supportive of regime norms. This type of regime 
supporter often falls short of regime norms because they are either unable to fulfill the change in 
behavior or because they accidentally fall short of the expectations. Third, “coincidental 
conformers” are states that are indifferent or opposed to the international convention, yet their 
behavior falls in line with the regime norms for reasons outside of the international convention. 
These states may choose to “selectively self-report” to the international convention if there are 
possible benefits. Finally, “intentional violators” are states that are opposed to regime norms and 
their behavior fails to conform to regime norms. These states are the least likely to self-report 
honestly or not report at all.  
 Intentional violators are difficult to identify. When states are vehemently against a 
regime, they may not report at all, in order to undermine the effectiveness of the regime.46 
Although those against regime norms are unlikely to report, not all states that fail to submit 
reports are against regime norms. In fact, international agreements as a whole have low reporting 
rates. In these cases, intentional non-reporters can more easily deviate undetected. For regimes 
with high reporting rates, intentional violators can also be difficult to identify because they are 
more likely to submit false reports, such as Russia’s false catch statistics in the International 
Whaling Commission.47 High levels of transparency in an international agreement rely on 
widespread and strong support of regime members because this transparency relies on the 
incentives and willingness of states to self-report their behavior. 48 
                                                
46 Mitchell. 118. 
47 Mitchell. 118. 
48 Mitchell. 118. 
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 Even high profile international environmental regimes such as the Montreal Protocol, the 
London Dumping Convention, the International Convention for the Protection of the Sea from 
Ships (MARPOL), and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 
all lack compliance with reporting requirements from member states.49 International 
environmental law scholars suggest different strategies to improve compliance in international 
agreements. “Rationalist” scholars believe that states will only comply with international treaty 
regimes if it serves in their best interest.50 These scholars propose an “enforcement model” treaty 
to help improve compliance, which imposes sanctions for members that do not comply.51 On the 
other hand, some scholars argue that a state’s compliance depends on the design of the treaty and 
the capacity of parties to comply with the rules. These scholars suggest the “managerial model” 
of compliance, which focuses on successful domestic implementation of the treaty.52 These two 
models are important to distinguish because one of them may be more successful in determining 
what international agreement models will result in the highest levels of compliance. 
A study on the reporting behavior of the Basel Convention member states may provide 
insight generally on the context in which international environmental conventions may 
successfully promote transparency and thus effectively change state behavior.  In this study, I 
examine the Basel Convention’s effectiveness by analyzing the reporting behavior of various 
countries. This information will help explain under which conditions Basel Convention members 
comply with the rules. This insight will allow me to identify what stands in the way of a 
successful international toxic waste trade system, and it will have broader implications on how to 
improve compliance in international environmental agreements. 
                                                
49 Mitchell. 112. 
50 Koh, H. H. (1997). “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law  Journal, 106, 8. 2632.  
51 Chayes, A. & Chayes, A. (1998). The New Sovereignty:  Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
52 Koh, 2641.	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Chapter 2: Assessing Reports and Imports in the Global Toxic Waste Trade  
Hazardous Waste Trade Reporting 
 Before the Basel Convention established a system of reporting, toxic waste crossed state 
borders without rules that required the waste to have a label that identified its origin. Without 
this knowledge and transparency, primarily developing countries dealt with harmful waste 
disposal. In order to facilitate a transparent system of transferring hazardous waste, the Basel 
Convention established a secretariat responsible for collecting annual reports from countries with 
information on the toxic waste both imported and exported by member countries. The import and 
export reports provide information on the type of waste disposed, where the waste was 
generated, where the waste will be sent, and finally whether the waste will be disposed or 
recycled and stripped for valuable materials.  
 These reports are detailed and are the best source of information on the international toxic 
waste trade. I analyze import reports submitted to the Basel Convention between 2010 and 2014, 
which the Basel Secretariat compiled into large excel files. During this analysis, I draw out 
information on the amount in metric tons or tonnes of toxic waste imported by countries, which 
are listed by country code. In the following sections, I refer to metric tons as “tonnes.” For each 
country, I average the amount of toxic waste reported as imported during 2010 to 2014. Year to 
year, individual countries do not drastically change the amount of toxic waste that they import, 
thus an average of reported amounts of waste is the best representation of their imports during 
this time frame. Some states do not submit reports for one or two years during the time frame. I 
take an average of the imports in years that these states do report to estimate on average what 
these states are taking in.  
	   12 
 Although reports sent to the Basel Convention are the best source of toxic waste import 
information, over half of the 180 parties with commitments under the Basel Convention are 
missing from the import report spreadsheets from the secretariat. In order to understand why 
these countries were excluded from the import excel sheets from the secretariat, I examine 
country reports that are available on an individual basis between 2001 and 2015.  
Missing Countries 
Table 1: Summary of reasons why countries are missing from the Basel Secretariat spreadsheets, 
and the number of countries included in each category.  
 




Provided Memo       
(37)  
Missing Import Info 
(62)  
Never Reported         
(21)  
 
 There are four reasons why these countries are not listed in the spreadsheets, and these 
reasons are summarized in Table 1. These reasons must be distinguished because they reflect 
varying levels of adherence to the reporting requirements of the Basel Convention. These reasons 
are explained in the following sections.   
 
  
 First, the six countries listed in Table 1a submitted reports but are not included in the 
spreadsheets from the Basel Secretariat because they submitted reports as excel documents rather 
than adhering to the format of the secretariat reporting system. Whoever compiled the 
spreadsheets at the Basel secretariat overlooked these states because these states’ import 
information was attached to their reports in a separate file.  
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Table 1b: Provided Memo (36) 
“Prohibits Import” 





















Central African Republic 































 Secondly, the thirty-six countries listed in Table 1b are missing from the spreadsheets 
because they did not submit any numbers to the report, but instead wrote in the memo section of 
the import report. Ten of these countries wrote in the memo line that importing toxic waste is 
prohibited. Twenty-four countries wrote that they did not accept any toxic waste imports, rather 
than writing zero on the import report. The final two countries that submitted reports and wrote 
in the memo line provided differing reasons. Mozambique wrote that it was in the process of 
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establishing infrastructure to safely process hazardous waste, and Swaziland wrote that it does 
not have a hazardous waste disposal facility; therefore, it cannot import toxic waste.  
Table 1c: Missing Import Info (62) 
Algeria 

















































Papua New Guinea  
Republic of Korea  
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Nevis 
 







Trinidad and Tobago 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 


















 Third, the sixty-two countries listed above in Table 1c submitted reports to the secretariat 
without providing import information. These countries put in the effort to submit reports, but did 
not provide information on their toxic waste imports. This reporting behavior could mean that 
these countries did not import any toxic waste and did not find it necessary to provide any import 
information, or it could indicate that these states are either purposefully or accidentally omitting 
import information. This category is of concern because these countries demonstrate some level 
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Table 1d:  Never Reported (21) 
Afghanistan 
Democratic People's                    
Republic of Korea 























 Finally, the twenty-one countries listed above in Table 1d never submitted reports. These 
countries are missing from the spreadsheet because they did not take the effort to submit reports. 
It could be that these countries are importing toxic waste in quantities that do not align with 
Basel’s guidelines for sound environmental disposal, or these countries may simply not want to 
allocate energy to submitting reports to the convention for various reasons. This group of 
countries is of concern because it comprises of 36% of the Basel Convention’s members and it 
indicates a substantial degree of non-compliance with the convention.  
Quantifying Missing Countries 
 In many cases it may be possible to determine how much waste a country is importing, 
even when that information is missing. In this section, I explain how the information from the 
sections above can fill in the gaps of toxic waste import information. First, I assume that 
countries that submit import information in an excel template provide honest information but in 
the wrong format. Import amounts of toxic waste are available in the import section of reports 
sent to the secretariat but attached separately as excel documents. Second, for countries without 
	   16 
toxic waste import reports but with memos specifying that they do not import toxic waste, I 
assume that these countries do not import any toxic waste.   
 The biggest group of counties missing from the spreadsheet is countries that submit 
reports but exclude import information in these reports. Although these countries mostly adhere 
to the reporting requirements of the Basel convention, they exclude important information from 
the reports. Thus, in order to estimate the import amounts for these countries, additional 
information is needed.  
 The final group of countries missing from the spreadsheets never submits reports to the 
Basel Convention. Countries that do not submit reports to an international agreement may be 
intentional violators who have outwardly opposed the norms of the agreement,53 or some states 
may simply lack the capacity to comply. Additional information is needed to estimate the toxic 
waste import amounts for these countries.  
Using Export Reports for Comparison 
 Additional information about Basel Convention member toxic waste import is available 
in the export reports submitted to the secretariat. Countries that export toxic waste must report 
which state they will send waste to. With this information I can determine how much a country 
imports in a year even if it does not submit an import report. Additionally, this information 
provides a basis of comparison between self-reports and information provided by countries 
exporting toxic waste. Many Basel Convention members do not adhere to the reporting 
requirements of the convention, which indicates that this agreement has not been fully successful 
in establishing transparency in the international toxic waste trade.  
 I analyze export reports submitted to the Basel Convention between 2010 and 2014, 
which the Basel Secretariat compiled into large excel files. I draw out information on the amount 
                                                
53 Mitchell. 118.  
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in tonnes of toxic waste exported to the country of destination, which are listed by country code. 
For each country, I sum the amount of toxic waste exported to a destination country within each 
year. At the end, I average the totals for each country during the time frame 2010-2014. 
Following this process, I am finally able to compare information provided by self-reports to 
information provided in export reports. This comparison is helpful to understand reporting 
behavior among all Basel Convention signatories, within both industrialized countries and 
developing countries.  
 
Figure 1a: The y-axis represents the amount of waste that exporting countries report that other countries 
are importing. The x-axis is what states self-report. The 1:1 line shows the reporting behavior ideal, in 
which the amount that countries self-report perfectly lines up with the amount that others report sending 
to them. 
 
 The figure above visualizes the comparison between toxic waste imports that are self-
reported and toxic waste imports that exporting countries report in industrialized countries. 
Although there are some countries that do not fit on the one to one line, most industrialized 



























import report amounts (tonnes log 10) 
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report sending to them. This reporting behavior is not entirely surprising, as industrialized 
countries likely have the best infrastructure to monitor exports and imports.  
 
Figure 1b: The y-axis represents the amount of waste that exporting countries report that other countries 
are importing. The x-axis is what states self-report. The 1:1 line shows the reporting behavior ideal, in 
which the amount that countries self-report perfectly lines up with the amount that others report sending 
to them. 
 
  Unlike industrialized countries, both self-reports and export reports sent to developing 
countries are not very accurate. Points above the line indicate cases of under-reporting, in which 
countries self-report less than other countries report sending to them. Points below the line 
indicate are “over-reporting” countries, which means that importing states report an amount of 
toxic waste that is higher than others report exporting to them. Cases of underreporting are much 
more prevalent in developing countries than industrialized countries. This difference in reporting 
accuracy indicates that there is less transparency in the toxic waste trade among developing 
countries.  Industrialized countries are generally reporting what they are doing, whereas 
developing countries have much more cases of over-reporting and under-reporting. In cases of 
over-reporting, exporting states presumably do not report everything that they export. If 
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countries who under-report much more often than industrialized countries. If this is the case, then 
the Basel Convention has been successful in establishing the norm that industrialized countries 
should not export toxic waste to developing countries.  
I can use the information from self-reports and from exporting countries to further 
understand why developing countries and industrialized countries have different reporting 
behaviors. I can quantify the extent of under-reporting and identify states that under-report the 
most. In following sections, I use the quantified amount of underreporting to identify trends and 
characteristics of countries that submit false information in an effort to understand how this 
happens.  
 











Toxic Waste reported 









Turkey  1   34,044  -100.0% 
China  1   21,119  -100.0% 
Morocco  1   18,111  -100.0% 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  1   10,405  -100.0% 
Georgia  1   3,954  -100.0% 
India  1   2,069  -100.0% 
Kazakhstan  1   1,784  -99.9% 
Ghana  1   1,674  -99.9% 
Macedonia  1   1,105  -99.9% 
Afghanistan   1   834  -99.9% 
United Arab Emirates  1   600  -99.8% 
Gambia  1   270  -99.6% 
Pakistan  1   261  -99.6% 
Argentina  1   242  -99.6% 
Senegal  1   169  -99.4% 
Brazil  20   2,171  -99.1% 
Suriname  1   88  -98.9% 
Saudi Arabia  1   30  -96.7% 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1   24  -95.8% 
Romania  1,736   39,302  -95.6% 
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Swaziland  1   19  -94.8% 
Hungary  2,901   37,473  -92.3% 
Slovakia  8,558   88,173  -90.3% 
Luxembourg  7,311   44,673  -83.6% 
Israel  1,672   8,729  -80.8% 
Switzerland  65,990   341,976  -80.7% 
Ukraine  3,094   11,789  -73.8% 
Czech Republic  28,364   38,747  -26.8% 
Poland  75,009   97,123  -22.8% 
Denmark  289,322   297,081  -2.6% 
Albania  1   1  0.0% 
Algeria  1   1  0.0% 
Antigua and Barbuda  1   1  0.0% 
Bahamas  1   1  0.0% 
Bangladesh  1   1  0.0% 
Barbados  1   1  0.0% 
Belize  1   1  0.0% 
Benin  1   1  0.0% 
Bhutan  1   1  0.0% 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  1   1  0.0% 
Botswana  1   1  0.0% 
Brunei Darussalam  1   1  0.0% 
Burkina Faso  1   1  0.0% 
Burundi  1   1  0.0% 
Cabo Verde  1   1  0.0% 
Cambodia  1   1  0.0% 
Cameroon  1   1  0.0% 
Central African Republic  1   1  0.0% 
Chad  1   1  0.0% 
Chile  1   1  0.0% 
Colombia  1   1  0.0% 
Comoros  1   1  0.0% 
Congo  1   1  0.0% 
Cook Islands  1   1  0.0% 
Côte d'Ivoire  1   1  0.0% 
Cuba  1   1  0.0% 
Democratic Republic of the Congo  1   1  0.0% 
Djibouti  1   1  0.0% 
Dominica  1   1  0.0% 
Dominican Republic  1   1  0.0% 
Ecuador  1   1  0.0% 
Egypt  1   1  0.0% 
El Salvador  1   1  0.0% 
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Equatorial Guinea  1   1  0.0% 
Eritrea  1   1  0.0% 
Ethiopia  1   1  0.0% 
Gabon  1   1  0.0% 
Guinea-Bissau  1   1  0.0% 
Guinea  1   1  0.0% 
Guyana  1   1  0.0% 
Honduras  1   1  0.0% 
Iceland  1   1  0.0% 
Indonesia  1   1  0.0% 
Iraq  1   1  0.0% 
Jamaica  1   1  0.0% 
Jordan  1   1  0.0% 
Kenya  1   1  0.0% 
Kiribati  1   1  0.0% 
Kuwait  1   1  0.0% 
Lao People's Democratic Republic  1   1  0.0% 
Lebanon  1   1  0.0% 
Lesotho  1   1  0.0% 
Liberia  1   1  0.0% 
Libya  1   1  0.0% 
Liechtenstein  1   1  0.0% 
Malawi  1   1  0.0% 
Maldives  1   1  0.0% 
Mali  1   1  0.0% 
Malta  1   1  0.0% 
Marshall Islands  1   1  0.0% 
Mauritania  1   1  0.0% 
Mauritius  1   1  0.0% 
Micronesia (Federated States of)  1   1  0.0% 
Monaco  1   1  0.0% 
Mongolia  1   1  0.0% 
Montenegro   1   1  0.0% 
Mozambique  1   1  0.0% 
Namibia  1   1  0.0% 
Nauru  1   1  0.0% 
Nepal  1   1  0.0% 
Nicaragua  1   1  0.0% 
Niger  1   1  0.0% 
Oman  1   1  0.0% 
Palau  1   1  0.0% 
Panama  1   1  0.0% 
Papua New Guinea  1   1  0.0% 
	   22 
Paraguay  1   1  0.0% 
Qatar  1   1  0.0% 
Rwanda  1   1  0.0% 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  1   1  0.0% 
Saint Lucia  1   1  0.0% 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  1   1  0.0% 
Samoa  1   1  0.0% 
Sao Tome and Principe  1   1  0.0% 
Seychelles  1   1  0.0% 
Somalia  1   1  0.0% 
Sri Lanka  1   1  0.0% 
Sudan  1   1  0.0% 
Syrian Arab Republic  1   1  0.0% 
Togo  1   1  0.0% 
Tonga  1   1  0.0% 
Trinidad and Tobago  1   1  0.0% 
Tunisia  1   1  0.0% 
Turkmenistan  1   1  0.0% 
Uganda  1   1  0.0% 
United Republic of Tanzania  1   1  0.0% 
Uruguay  1   1  0.0% 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  1   1  0.0% 
Viet Nam  1   1  0.0% 
Yemen  1   1  0.0% 
Zambia  1   1  0.0% 
Zimbabwe  1   1  0.0% 
France  592,860   579,306  2.3% 
Serbia  2,281   2,180  4.6% 
Japan  14,652   13,973  4.9% 
Slovenia  28,950   26,944  7.4% 
Sweden  935,478   843,010  11.0% 
Portugal  11,538   10,271  12.3% 
Singapore  9,746   8,649  12.7% 
Spain  197,072   151,671  29.9% 
Lithuania  8,672   6,537  32.7% 
Latvia  71,897   53,976  33.2% 
Bulgaria  22,856   16,997  34.5% 
Germany   3,547,001   2,286,619  55.1% 
United Kingdom of Great Britain   205,921   123,684  66.5% 
South Africa  253,885   150,201  69.0% 
Finland  87,456   49,034  78.4% 
Austria  278,306   155,894  78.5% 
Netherlands  3,707,586   1,990,195  86.3% 
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Norway  714,936   367,615  94.5% 
Ireland  14,643   7,113  105.9% 
Malaysia  120,784   39,768  203.7% 
Thailand  9,557   2,768  245.2% 
Cyprus  26,607   7,651  247.8% 
Greece  6,476   1,829  254.1% 
Estonia  154,222   39,868  286.8% 
Costa Rica  10,380   2,088  397.1% 
Belgium  2,092,872   351,519  495.4% 
Australia  5,570   870  540.5% 
Nigeria  10   1  900.0% 
Italy   1,509,049   105,137  1335.3% 
Peru  252,590   11,205  2154.2% 
Guatemala  91,834   3,971  2212.8% 
Philippines  267,887   9,325  2772.7% 
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  56,651   1,686  3261.1% 
Russian Federation  3,312,511   27,499  11945.8% 
Republic of Moldova  145   1  14422.0% 
Kyrgyzstan  202   1  20094.0% 
Canada  378,722   1,786  21107.5% 
Croatia  334   1  33297.0% 
Armenia  930   1  92877.5% 
Andorra  1,108   1  110675.0% 
Mexico  3,861,864   3,093  124738.3% 
Madagascar  2,205   1  220400.0% 
New Zealand  2,426   1  242514.8% 
Bahrain  11,877   1  1187637.4% 
Azerbaijan  15,044   1  1504340.0% 
Belarus  396,568   1  39656695.0% 
Uzbekistan  1,162,915   1  116291410.0% 
 
  The information listed in Table 2 is essential to identifying states that participate in 
deviant reporting behaviors, such as submitting false information or failing to report at all, even 
if a state is importing toxic waste. This comparative analysis should provide insight into the 
motives of convention members, and the degree to which these countries are adhering to the 
reporting requirements of the agreement. Overall, this analysis allows us to judge whether or not 
the Basel Convention is succeeding at its goal of promoting transparency in the global toxic 
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waste trade, and therefore its success in establishing the accountability necessary to make the 
global toxic waste trade as safe as possible, especially for developing countries.  
Quantifying Comparison of Export Reports 
 This section explains specifically how I quantify the reporting relationships between self-
reported imports and import information from export reports. The quantified comparison uses a 
percent difference formula between the amount of self-reported imports and the amount of waste 
from export reports. This formula requires using ratios to compare the two sets of data in order to 
account for the scale of difference. Due to the mathematical error of dividing by zero, I replaced 
any number reported as a zero as a one, in order to avoid this mathematical limitation.  
Categories of Reporting Behavior 
Table 3: Summary of import and export comparison reporting behaviors, listed with number of 
countries in each category.  
 
Countries that report 
zero, but others report 
















 After calculating these percent differences, I organized the countries into different 
categories of reporting behavior, summarized above in Table 3. It is important to distinguish 
these categories of behavior because they vary in degree of compliance to the reporting 
requirements of the Basel Convention. Countries that fall into these categories are listed in tables 
in the sections that follow. These tables display the amount of imported toxic waste that the 
country self-reports, in the column listed as “amount in import report.” In the column listed as 
“amount in export report,” the table displays the amount of toxic waste that exporting countries 
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report sending to that country.  The final column displays the percent difference between the 
two. When reading the following sections, note that amounts written as 1 are actually 0. 
Table 3a: Countries that report or imply to import zero, but others report export to these 
countries (15) 
Country                         
 
Argentina 








Republic of Korea 
Senegal 
Swaziland* 
The former Yugoslav Rep. of Macedonia 
Turkey* 




















Amount in Export 
Report 
 242  
 24  
 21,119  
 270  
 3,954  
 1,674  
 1,784  
 18,111  
 261  
 190,837  
 169  
 19  
 1,105  
 34,044  




















*These countries said that they imported zero toxic waste or prohibit toxic waste imports, yet evidence 
from export reports indicates that they do import. 
 
 The countries listed above in Table 3a are countries that either implied importing zero by 
listing a memo, reporting zero imports of toxic waste, or by submitting a report without import 
information, yet other countries report sending toxic waste to these countries. The countries that 
list memos are not complying in a different way than those who do not report. They submit false 
information rather than implying that they do not import toxic waste. When scanning the table, 
note the relative amounts of toxic waste imported to the other countries. Swaziland took in only 
19 tonnes of toxic waste when claiming zero toxic waste in its import reports, whereas Turkey 
took in 34,000 tonnes of toxic waste when reporting zero imports.  
 
   
	   26 
Table 3b: Under-reporting Countries (11) 
Country 
 























































 The countries listed above in Table 3b reported less toxic waste in their import reports 
than other countries exported to them. These countries cooperate with the Basel Convention in 
the sense that they submit reports, but these reports appear to contain faulty information.   








Afghanistan 1 834 -99.9% 
Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea 
1 10,405 -100.0% 
India 1 2,069 -100.0% 
Saudi Arabia 1 30 -63.3% 
Suriname 1 88 -98.9% 
  
 The countries listed above in Table 3c never submitted reports to the Basel convention, 
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U.K. Great Britain 
Uzbekistan 
Amount Import  
1,108  
 930  
 5,570  
 278,306  
 15,044  
 11,877  
 396,568  
 2,092,872  
 22,856  
 378,722  
 10,380  
 334  
 26,607  
 154,222  
 87,456  
 592,860  
 3,547,001  
 6,476  
 91,834  
 56,651  
 14,643  
 1,509,049  
 14,652  
 202  
 71,897  
 8,672  
 2,205  
 120,784  
 3,861,864  
 3,707,586  
 2,426  
 10  
 714,936  
 252,590  
 267,887  
 11,538  
 145  
 3,312,511  
 2,281  
 9,746  
 28,950  
 253,885  
 197,072  
 935,478  
 9,557  
 205,921  
                        1,162,915 
Amount Export  
1  
 1  
 870  
 155,894  
 1  
 1  
 1  
 351,519  
 16,997  
 1,786  
 2,088  
 1  
 7,651  
 39,868  
 49,034  
 579,306  
 2,286,619  
 1,829  
 3,971  
 1,686  
 7,113  
 105,137  
 13,973  
 1  
 53,976  
 6,537  
 1  
 39,768  
 3,093  
 1,990,195  
 1  
 1  
 367,615  
 11,205  
 9,325  
 10,271  
 1  
 27,499  
 2,180  
 8,649  
 26,944  
 150,201  
 151,671  
 843,010  
 2,768  

















































          100% 
 
 The countries listed above in Table 3d are countries that report more imported toxic 
waste than other countries report sending to them. I assume that states would not intentionally 
	   28 
inflate the amount of toxic waste they receive. I therefore assume that their self-reports are 
accurate. Presumably, some exporting countries under-report the waste sent to these countries. 
However, this category of reporting does not provide insight to the reporting behavior of the 
country itself because the error or omission most likely occurs in other countries’ export reports.  
Table 3e: Countries that neither report imports nor are reported (91) 
Albania 
Algeria 











































































Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 


















 Finally, some countries do not appear to take in any waste. In these cases, countries do 
not submit import reports, and exporting countries do not report sending waste to these countries. 
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These countries are listed above in Table 3e. It is reasonable to assume that these counties 
therefore really do not get any toxic waste imports.  
Bamako Convention Signatories  








































 Members of the Bamako Convention, which are listed above in Table 4, were 
disappointed by the shortcomings of the Basel Convention to protect their countries from toxic 
waste disposal from wealth countries. These countries sought an alternative solution from the 
Basel Convention to protect their countries by signing onto the Bamako Convention. Reporting 
behavior and import amounts of Bamako Convention members provides some insight into the 
effectiveness of an additional environmental treaty that sought to improve the international toxic 
waste trade system. The Bamako convention is an additional commitment for a country to refuse 
waste, thus these countries are likely not taking in toxic waste. The reporting behavior to the 
Basel Convention described in the following sections may provide insight in the Bamako 
Convention’s success in influencing the toxic waste trade.  
   
  




 Bamako Convention members that did not submit reports to the secretariat, which are 
listed above in Table 4a, likely did so out of discontentment with the shortcomings of the Basel 
Convention. Additionally, these Bamako Convention members have never been reported as 
destinations of exposal in export reports. Thus, these Bamako members are likely not taking in 
any waste.  
Table 4b: Bamako Convention Members that reported 














 The Bamako Convention members listed above in Table 4b have signed on to an 
additional commitment to refuse toxic waste imports and have legally declared no imports of 
toxic waste, yet other countries have listed these countries as the destination for toxic waste 
export disposal. However, these states imported very small amounts of toxic waste, especially 







Table 4a Bamako Convention members that 
did not submit reports to the Basel secretariat 
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Table 4c: Bamako Convention Members that Imported 














 Two Bamako Convention members listed above in Table 4c self-reported to import toxic 
waste. Madagascar imported substantially more toxic waste than Nigeria, but 2,200 tonnes of 
toxic waste is not very much waste.  





























 The Bamako Convention members listed above in Table 4d neither reported import 
information, nor were reported as a destination of disposal in export reports. With no information 
from either source, I estimate that these 25 countries, accounting for the majority of Bamako 
Convention signatories, are not importing toxic waste.  
 Overall, the information in this section suggests that the Bamako Convention has been 
effective in its goal to eliminate toxic waste imports to member countries. Although some 
Bamako Convention members import waste, they make up a very small portion of the treaty 
members and import very little toxic waste.  
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Toxic Waste Import Information 
 By comparing both import and export reports, I am able to predict the amount of toxic 
waste that states are most likely importing. I expect that exporting states have little to no 
incentive to report more toxic waste than they are sending to importing countries, and importing 
countries have no incentive to report that they are importing more waste than they are. Thus, 
when comparing the amounts of toxic waste listed in both self-reported import reports and in 
export reports, I estimate that the larger amount of toxic waste listed is the most likely import 
amount. Additionally, this comparison allows me to estimate the toxic waste import amounts for 
countries that do not submit self-reports of import amounts. 
Table 5: How much waste states are actually receiving 
country 
Albania 
amount actually receiving (tonnes) 
0 
Algeria 0 







Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0 
Botswana 0 
Brunei Darussalam 0 
Burkina Faso 0 
Burundi 0 
Cabo Verde 0 
Cambodia 0 
Cameroon 0 






Cook Islands 0 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 
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Cuba 0 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 
Djibouti 0 
Dominica 0 
Dominican Republic 0 
Ecuador 0 
Egypt 0 
El Salvador 0 


























Marshall Islands 0 
Mauritania 0 
Mauritius 0 
Micronesia (Federated States of) 0 
Monaco 0 
Mongolia 0 
Montenegro  0 
Mozambique 0 
Namibia 0 












Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 
Saint Lucia 0 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0 
Samoa 0 
Sao Tome and Principe 0 
Seychelles 0 
Somalia 0 
Sri Lanka 0 
Sudan 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 0 
Togo 0 
Tonga 0 




United Republic of Tanzania 0 
Uruguay 0 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0 




Nigeria  10  
Swaziland  19  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  24  
Saudi Arabia  30  
Suriname  88  
Republic of Moldova  145  
Senegal  169  
Kyrgyzstan  202  
Argentina  242  
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Pakistan  261  
Gambia  270  
Croatia  334  
United Arab Emirates  600  
Afghanistan   834  
Armenia  930  
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
 1,105  
Andorra  1,108  
Ghana  1,674  
Kazakhstan  1,784  
India  2,069  
Brazil  2,171  
Madagascar  2,205  
Serbia  2,281  
New Zealand  2,426  
Georgia  3,954  
Australia  5,570  
Greece  6,476  
Lithuania  8,672  
Israel  8,729  
Thailand  9,557  
Singapore  9,746  
Costa Rica  10,380  
Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 
 10,405  
Portugal  11,538  
Ukraine  11,789  
Bahrain  11,877  
Ireland  14,643  
Japan  14,652  
Azerbaijan  15,044  
Morocco  18,111  
China  21,119  
Bulgaria  22,856  
Cyprus  26,607  
Slovenia  28,950  
Turkey  34,044  
Hungary  37,473  
Czech Republic  38,747  
Romania  39,302  
Luxembourg  44,673  
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  56,651  
Latvia  71,897  
	   36 
Finland  87,456  
Slovakia  88,173  
Guatemala  91,834  
Poland  97,123  
Malaysia  120,784  
Estonia  154,222  
Republic of Korea  190,837  
Spain  197,072  
United Kingdom of Great Britain   205,921  
Peru  252,590  
South Africa  253,885  
Philippines  267,887  
Austria  278,306  
Denmark  297,081  
Switzerland  341,976  
Canada  378,722  
Belarus  396,568  
France  592,860  
Norway  714,936  
Sweden  935,478  
Uzbekistan  1,162,915  
Italy   1,509,049  
Belgium  2,092,872  
Russian Federation  3,312,511  
Germany   3,547,001  
Netherlands  3,707,586  
Mexico  3,861,864  
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Figure 5: This graph shows the portion of countries in the Basel Convention that import certain ranges of 
toxic waste amounts.  
 
The groups of toxic waste amounts provide an overall idea of how much toxic waste 
members are importing. The majority of Basel Convention members do not import toxic waste. 
In the following section, I use these toxic waste import estimates to learn more about Basel 
Convention member reporting behavior. The information in Figure 5 helps contextualize what 
amount of toxic waste imports is large and what is small for the following section.  
Comparing Reporting Behavior and Import Amounts 
 In this section, I review the relationship between non-reporters and the amount of toxic 
waste that they receive in order to answer the question: how important is non-reporting? 
Members of the Basel Convention may not uphold their reporting requirements in three different 
ways. First, some countries never submit any reports to the Basel Convention. This is the most 
extreme version of non-reporting. Other countries submit reports, but they do not include import 
information in the reports. Although submitting a report indicates some level of compliance with 
zero	  57%	  1-­‐1,000	  tonnes	  8%	  
1,000-­‐10,000	  tonnes	  9%	  
10,000-­‐100,000	  tonnes	  13%	  
100,000-­‐1,000,000	  tonnes	  9%	   over	  1,000,000	  tonnes	  4%	  
Portion of Import Amounts 
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the Basel Convention, a report submitted with missing information does not help facilitate 
transparency in the Basel Convention. Thus, it is important to understand how important missing 
information from reports is. The remaining countries without toxic waste import information 
provide memos instead of submitting import reports. Although the memo provides more details 
that the countries with missing information, these countries are still not providing import 
information.  
 
Figure 5a displays the portion of non-reporting countries that import certain amounts of toxic waste.  
 
The majority of countries that did not submit reports to the secretariat were not importing 
toxic waste. Of the 24% of countries that imported toxic waste without submitting reports, Saudi 
Arabia and Suriname imported very little toxic waste (under 100 tonnes). India and Afghanistan 
never submitted reports to the Basel convention but imported relatively small amounts of toxic 
waste (under 2,000 tonnes). However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea imported a 
large portion of toxic waste without reporting it (10,405 tonnes). Overall, non-reporting does not 
substantially alter the transparency of the Basel Convention, since most non-reporters did not 
import waste.  
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Figure 5b The figure above displays the portion of countries that submitted reports with missing import 
information that imports certain ranges of toxic waste amounts.  
 
About one-third of countries with obligations to Basel submitted reports to the 
convention with missing import information. Of these 62 countries, only 10% imported toxic 
waste. The majority of states that imported toxic waste imported relatively low amounts of toxic 
waste (between 200 to 2,000 tonnes). These countries are Argentina, Ghana, Kazakhstan, 
Senegal and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Overall, countries that submit reports 
to the Basel Convention with missing import information do not considerably reduce the 
transparency of the global toxic waste trade. However, the Republic of Korea is a major 
exception to this trend, having imported 190,800 tonnes of toxic waste.  
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Figure 5c The figure above displays the portion of countries missing import information but who provide 
memos that import certain amounts of toxic waste.  
 
 Thirty-three countries submitted memos rather than import reports with numbers of toxic 
waste. Of this group, 19% imported toxic waste. Unlike the former categories of non-reporting, 
countries that submit memos rather than import amounts are importing relatively larger amounts 
of toxic waste. China, Morocco, and Turkey, import over 18,000 tonnes of toxic waste. Georgia 
imports a moderate to low amount of toxic waste, about 4,000 tonnes. Meanwhile, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Pakistan, and Swaziland import under 300 tonnes of toxic waste. Overall, countries 
that submit memos hinder transparency in the global toxic waste trade more than non-reporting 
countries or countries that report with missing information because more of these countries 
imported larger amounts of toxic waste. Furthermore, these countries actively submitted false 
information to the secretariat.  
Conclusion 
 There is a great deal of non-reporting and non-accurate or incomplete reporting in the 
Basel Convention, which limits the effectiveness of the treaty. The Basel Convention aims to 
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improve the international toxic waste trade by establishing a reporting system to facilitate 
transparency. Without widespread compliance to reporting requirements, there is a decreased 
chance of improving the conditions under which waste is both traded and disposed of. A 
reporting system that facilitates honest and full participation will establish the transparency 
needed to ensure that toxic waste is discarded in an environmentally sound and equitable 
manner.   
 Thus far, the data suggests two conclusions about developing countries in the Basel 
Convention. First, the analysis above provides some insight to the success of the Bamako 
Convention. If the Basel Convention does not go far enough to protect developing countries, 
does the Bamako Convention provide an additional layer of policy to prevent inequitable 
disposal of toxic waste in developing nations? Overall, Bamako convention members do not 
import toxic waste, and if they do, they import very little. Thus, the Bamako Convention appears 
to serve as an additional protection to developing countries against importing unwanted toxic 
waste. Second, toxic waste trading among developing countries is less transparent. There are 
higher instances of non-reporting and inaccurate reporting among developing countries, which 
suggests that the Basel Convention must go further in providing support to developing nations to 
establish better reporting systems.  
Moving Forward 
 Identifying country characteristics that maximize transparency in self-reporting may 
provide better insight to assess the success of the Basel convention. Member states of 
international conventions have differing capacities to provide accurate and quality information to 
increase regime transparency. Member states self-report information to the Basel secretariat, and 
the accuracy and quality of self-reporting may change depending on the characteristics of the 
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actor providing the information.54 In order to understand why states report in the manner that 
they report, we must carefully evaluate characteristics of the states that are reporting. If certain 
characteristics are associated with compliance, I will gain insight to the conditions under which 
the Basel Convention can effectively promote a transparent and safe global toxic waste trade. 
 The following chapters are broken into two sections. In the first section of each chapter, I 
first examine whether a county’s reporting behavior changes within a certain context. In order to 
comply with Basel Convention reporting requirements, members must submit accurate toxic 
waste import information to the Basel Convention secretariat. In the second half of each chapter, 
I examine whether a country’s decision to accept toxic is associated with a particular country 
characteristic. I measure a country’s decision to import toxic waste using information from the 
section above, which lists the propositions that guide my estimate of the amount of toxic waste 
that each state actually imports. A country’s decision to accept toxic waste imports may indicate 
its commitment to the environmentally sound disposal of toxic waste depending on the context 
that it imports the toxic waste.  














                                                
54 Mitchell. 116.  
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Chapter 3: Wealth 
In order to understand the conditions needed for Basel Convention members to comply 
with the rules, it is useful to first understand what conditions generally allow for better 
compliance in international agreements. As mentioned in Chapter 1, some scholars believe that 
member states’ compliance with an international environmental agreement depends on the 
capacity of parties to comply with the rules.55 Without successful domestic implementation of 
treaty requirements, there is little chance that countries will comply. Although most countries 
want better environmental conditions, wealthier countries are often more inclined to participate 
in international environmental agreements.56 This is likely a consequence of capacity.  
With respect to the Basel Convention, members must establish a reporting system within 
their own countries to comply with the reporting requirements of the agreement. Poor countries 
face an additional hurdle to domestically implement the Basel Convention than industrialized 
member countries. The reporting system of Basel requires strong border protection and the 
bureaucracy to staff them. Many industrialized countries already have border infrastructure and 
have more money to implement a new reporting system. Thus, developing countries are left with 
more work to domestically implement the agreement and have less money to create a new 
system. A country’s wealth in this sense may hinder its capacity to comply with the Basel 
Convention.  
If wealth influences a state’s reporting behavior, the Basel Convention would fit the 
managerial model of compliance, suggesting that reporting is an issue of capacity, rather than 
intention, that explains a state’s behavior.  If this is the case, then the convention should provide 
more resources to assist countries with domestic implementation. If wealth does not influence a 
                                                
55 Koh, 2641.	  Chayes, A. & Chayes, A. 	  
56 Drumbl, M. (2002) “Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law.” Tulane Law 
Review, 76, 843. 847.  
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state’s reporting behavior, then we have reason to believe that capacity is not a limiting factor of 
compliance. This finding would suggest that the Basel Convention should follow the 
“enforcement model,” to establish sanctions to punish states that do not comply with convention 
rules.  
In order to answer the question of why developing countries import toxic waste, we must 
consider the priorities of these countries. While developing countries likely want sustainable 
environmental conditions, they must first address basic needs like access to safe drinking water 
and malnutrition. Impoverished countries are more likely to experience economic desperation, 
and may sacrifice sustainable or safe environmental conditions in order to survive. Thus, wealth 
may influence how much toxic waste a country imports.  
Operationalization 
I measure wealth with gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which measures the total 
economic output of a country divided by the number of individuals living in the country. This 
measurement accounts for a country’s population size and provides a better societal 
representation of the country than an alternative that looks only at aggregate wealth. There are a 
few limitations to using GDP per capita as a measure of wealth. First, it does not factor in the 
costs of living specific to the country, which helps contextualize wealth and economic need. 
Second, GDP per capita does not account for the wealth distribution within a country, which may 
prevent representation of the majority of the population. Despite these limitations, GDP per 
capita is the universal measurement of development or national wealth in policy and 
international development literature.57 In this study I use GDP per capita estimates from 2015, 
which is the most recent year with information available for almost all countries. Some countries 
                                                
57 Bonini, A. (2008). “Cross-National Variation in Individual Life Satisfaction: Effects of National 
Wealth, Human Development, and Environmental Conditions.” Social Indicators Research.  
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are missing estimates of GDP per capita in 2015, so I used estimates from as far back as 2010 to 
ensure that all the countries in this study would have a wealth measurement.   
Reporting 
 A state with limited wealth likely has inadequate capacity to implement a quality 
reporting system. Poor countries have less infrastructure and resources to enforce the domestic 
laws of an environmental agreement.58 In order to uphold reporting requirements of the Basel 
Convention, states must establish a reporting system, including potentially costly infrastructure. 
One aspect of reporting to the Basel Convention secretariat involves establishing one or more 
competent authorities to monitor and report to the secretariat toxic waste that enters and exits 
state borders.59  
Toxic waste can enter or exit the state without notifying the competent authority if there 
are no customs services in place to strictly regulate the movement of traded goods across 
borders. Developing countries often lack efficient customs services, thus poor countries are less 
able to staff and patrol border crossings with a tightly regulated customs service. 60 Without the 
wealth to establish this infrastructure, poorer states may not have access to accurate information 
on the imports of toxic waste into their country.    
 In addition to limiting reporting accuracy, a lack of wealth may also cause countries to 
neglect reporting requirements altogether. Some poor countries may find the cost of establishing 
a domestic reporting system to be too great, especially if a country does not intend to import 
toxic waste. The poorest countries lack industrialization and urbanization61 and may not find it 
                                                
58 Drumbl. 848. 
59 The Basel Convention. Article 5 (1-3).  
60 De Wulf, L., and José B. Sokol, eds. (2005). Customs modernization handbook. Washington D.C.: 
World Bank Publications. 
61 Dunlap, R. E. and Jorgenson, A. K. (2012). “Environmental Problems.” The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Globalization. 
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necessary to contribute resources to establish a reporting system if they do not produce toxic 
wastes and do not possess the infrastructure to process toxic waste. In these cases, less wealthy 
states may not accept toxic waste imports from other countries, but they also may not dedicate 
resources to reporting.  
 In the following section, I examine the average GDP per capita of countries importing 
toxic waste and the category of reporting to which they belong. I divided reporting behavior into 
four categories. First, “good reporters” are countries that submit reports in excel format, self-
report either more than or within 10% percent difference of what is reported in export reports, or 
that submit reports with missing import information, but exporting countries do not report 
sending to them. I consider these countries as good reporters because they submit or imply 
accurate report import information. “Memo-reporters” do not submit import amounts, but instead 
write a memo describing imports. They are in a separate category of reporting because they 
submit reports in a simplified format, which may suggest some lack of capacity. “Non-reporters” 
never submit reports. Finally, “false reporters” either under-report their imports or do not submit 
import amounts and exporting countries report sending waste to them.  
 In the next section, I limit my focus to reporting behavior within developing countries. 
Industrialized countries are already wealthier on average, so wealth is not as much of a concern 
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Wealth and Reporting Behavior  
 
Figure 1: Wealth and reporting behavior in all Basel Countries.  
 
 As expected, the most accurate reporters are the wealthiest group of countries. These 
countries have the infrastructure to implement quality reporting systems within their countries 
and thus have access to accurate import information. Interestingly, false reporters are not that 
much less wealthy than the most accurate reporters. This may indicate that countries have the 
capacity to report accurately, but are purposefully submitting false information to the Basel 
Convention secretariat. Countries that never report to the Basel Convention and only submit 
memos are among some of the poorest, which suggests that the wealth of these countries limits 
their capacity to implement a proper reporting system. Instead of submitting a report with import 
information, poorer countries may find it easier to write a memo. Poor countries that never report 
likely chose not to spend money on a reporting system.    
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Figure 1a: Wealth and reporting behavior in developing Basel Convention countries.  
 
Reporting behavior within developing countries (Figure 1a) generally follows the same 
trend as all Basel Convention members (Figure 1). In developing countries, members that 
submit memos are slightly wealthier on average than countries that never report to the Basel 
Convention. This suggests that wealth may influence a state’s capacity to uphold reporting 
requirements. The poorest countries do not establish reporting systems. Within developing 
countries, there is a slight difference in average wealth between countries that accurately report 
and countries that submit false information. This suggests reporting accuracy may also be limited 
by a state’s capacity to implement a quality reporting system.  
This information suggests that most developing countries are “good faith non-
conformers” in regard to reporting. They may agree with the norms of the Basel Convention but 
cannot uphold legal obligations of the agreement because they are unable to change in behavior. 
It is possible that developing countries with obligations to the Basel Convention want to 
implement a domestic reporting system but are financially unable to establish one. In order to 
improve reporting participation in developing countries, wealthier members of the Basel 
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Convention should provide resources to developing countries to implement domestic reporting 
systems.  
Amount of Imported Waste  
 Wealth may also influence a country’s decision to accept toxic waste imports. Poverty 
often leads to environmental degradation through short time horizons. When states make 
environmental decisions, leaders must make the choice between meeting current needs and 
prioritizing long term benefits that may be more costly in the interim. The government will 
prioritize current financial needs over harmful consequences in the future, which postpones 
action on environmental protection. In conditions of poverty this decision is understandable. If 
funds are limited, immediately more expensive options are not plausible even if they are better in 
the long term.  
 In an examination of multiple studies investigating the relationship between poverty and 
environmental degradation, people in ninety percent of cases revealed short time horizons in 
decision-making. 62 For example, poor farmers harvest resources at unsustainable levels because 
they must make ends meet and sell what they can to have enough money to survive.63 This 
pathway operates at both the individual and societal level. High discount rates result from 
pressing basic needs that make people in poor countries desperate, and their circumstances often 
result in environmentally degrading activities.64 Marginal groups adopt environmentally 
degrading activities because they have no alternatives available to maintain subsistence. 
 
                                                
62 Duraiappah, A. K. (1998). “Poverty and environmental degradation: A review and analysis of the 
nexus.” World Development, 26, 12.  
63 Duraiappah, 2175. 
64 Clapp, J. & Dauvergne, P. (1997). “Economic Growth in a World of Wealth and Poverty.” In Paths to a 
Green World The Political Economy of the Global Environment. 107.  
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Figure 2: Environmental Kuznets Curve65 
 
 Discounting the future can guide the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) trend. The 
EKC reflects a relationship in which a country becomes wealthier and environmental degradation 
initially increases until it hits a turning point at a certain level of wealth. At this point, 
environmental degradation declines. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the line representing the 
relationship is an inverted U-shape curve.66 The EKC generally applies to environmental 
degradation in the form of pollutants, such as particulates and nitrogen and sulfur oxides.67 It has 
also been found for deforestation and access to clean water and sanitation.68  
As a country becomes wealthier, it experiences longer time horizons. Once urgent and 
basic needs are met, actors can afford to prioritize the future. With a more future oriented 
society, the political structure of the state responds by setting environmental legislation and other 
policies set to protect the environment.69 Similarly, as a country becomes wealthier, the state as a 
whole has a longer time horizon and there is less of a pressing need to accept environmental 
                                                
65 Williams, Jeremy . Environmental Kuznets Curve. Digital image. Word Press. Web. 
66Yandle et al. (2004). “Environmental Kuznets Curves.” PERC. Research Study 02-1. 
67 Shafik, N. (1994). “Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An Econometric Analysis.” 
Oxford Economic Papers, 46. Seldon, T.M., & Song, D. (1994). “Environmental Quality and 
Development: Is There a Kuznets Curve for Air Pollution Emissions?” Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 27.  
68 Clapp, J. & Dauvergne, P. 93 
69 Lopez, R. & Mitra, S. (2000). “Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment Curve.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 40. 
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harms and can afford to establish better infrastructure. An EKC can also happen for individuals, 
whose needs have been met and have the time and resources to pressure the government to create 
better environmental conditions. 
 The discount rates that lead to environmental degradation may also apply to toxic waste 
imports. Toxic waste is traded as a good, and it is a potential source of money for countries 
willing to import and process it. Growing levels of international debt beginning in the 1980s and 
1990s have left developing countries vulnerable to the global economy.70 Poorer countries are 
more likely to discount the future and may be more willing to import toxic waste for short-term 
financial gain despite lacking the proper infrastructure to safely process it. Jennifer Clapp has 
suggested this connection, arguing that developing countries are more willing to accept  “rich 
countries’ unwanted hazards because they came with a promise of much needed foreign 
exchange.”71 The Basel Convention was formed due to desire in the developing world to reduce 
toxic waste disposal in developing countries. It is possible that poor members of this convention 
face such short time horizons that they have no choice but to accept more toxic waste than is safe 
for their citizens.  
 In the following section, I look at a country’s GDP per capita measured in U.S. dollars 
but with a log scale transformation to more easily read the graph. It is appropriate to use logs in 
data sets that vary by large degrees and that may be skewed in a particular direction. I compare 
the wealth of a country to the log transformed amount of toxic waste that we know states are 
actually receiving from Chapter 2.  
 
 
                                                
70 Clapp. 11.  
71 Clapp. 11.  
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Wealth and Toxic Waste Imports  
 
Figure 3: Wealth and Toxic Waste Import Amounts.  
 
In general, there is a slightly positive association between wealth and toxic waste 
imports. Wealthier countries tend to import more toxic waste. This observation suggests that less 
wealthy Basel Convention members do not import toxic waste to meet financial needs created by 
poverty. Toxic waste imports do not seem to follow an EKC, because wealthier countries appear 
to import the most amounts of toxic waste. Overall, it seems that countries do not import toxic 
waste out of economic need. This is excellent news. One of the goals of the Basel Convention is 
to limit toxic waste exports such that only countries with the capacity to accept them safely do 
so.  
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More importantly, looking within the group of developing countries in Figure 3a, those 
most at risk, tells us more about patterns of imports. There does not appear to be a clear pattern 
between wealth and toxic waste imports within developing countries. This suggests that the 
poorest developing countries are not importing toxic waste out of desperation but potentially for 
different reasons. Overall, it appears that members of the Basel Convention do not import toxic 
waste because of desperate economic need. This is excellent news for those concerned that the 
toxic waste trade may be taking place in a context of environmental injustice. 
 Although developing countries face many economic hardships, it is good to know that the 
toxic waste trade is generally not used as a source of revenue in dire economic circumstances for 
developing countries. Toxic waste has the potential to cause major health problems, thus it is not 




 In this chapter, I have found that wealth most likely influences a state’s capacity to 
implement a reporting system. The poorest members of the Basel Convention either do not 
submit reports or do not provide detailed import information in their reports. Wealth may slightly 
explain inaccurate reports. Other characteristics may help explain under-reporting to the Basel 
Convention secretariat. Another finding of this chapter is that wealth does not determine toxic 
waste imports in developing countries. Poor countries do not import toxic waste out of economic 
desperation. In fact, the Basel Convention has been somewhat successful in setting the rule that 
industrialized countries are better equipped to import toxic waste and should import the most 
toxic waste.  
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Chapter 4: Inequality 
 Inequality may have implications for a country’s capacity to establish a domestic 
reporting system. Countries with large inequalities may need to allocate resources to address 
more pressing needs than improved environmental conditions because more members of society 
are impoverished. Highly unequal countries may be less likely to establish reporting systems 
because they face similar capacity issues to poor countries. Inequality may also reduce a 
country’s level of environmental concern, which could reduce its commitment to domestically 
implementing treaty obligations, such as a reporting system or safe management of toxic waste 
imports. Or inequality may influence its environmental behavior more directly, causing it to act 
like a poorer country than its average level of wealth may suggest.  
Operationalization 
 The GINI index is the most widely used measurement of inequality within countries. The 
World Bank estimates this index through household survey data as a tool for global poverty 
monitoring.72  The GINI index is measured on a range between 0 and 1 (but is usually calculated 
as a percentage) and is based on residents' net income and helps define the gap between the rich 
and the poor. Zero represents perfect equality and 1 or 100% represents perfect inequality. In this 
study, I use the GINI index for whatever year is most current for that country. The most recent 
year with information available is 2013. The GINI index is not measured for every country in 
each year, so I used index measures from as far back as 1995 to find information on as many 
countries as possible. It is important to note that there is some limitation in the GINI index as a 
measurement of inequality in this study. The World Bank does not make estimates for every 
country because the GINI index is calculated based on household surveys, thus the governments 
                                                
72 “GINI index.” (N.d.). The World Bank. Web.  
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of these countries must allow these surveys to be taken, which creates a smaller study group of 
countries to analyze. 73 The final data set in Chapter 4 is missing 33 Basel members. 
Reporting  
 Inequality might influence a state’s commitment to establish a quality toxic waste 
reporting system. Some studies suggest that inequality reduces environmental concern.74 For 
example, states with greater inequality failed to report to the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),75 although that study examined only a 
small sample size of countries. Countries with large income inequalities may be more concerned 
with issues of income redistribution and economic development than environmental quality.76 If 
countries are not as concerned with environmental quality, then they are less likely to devote 
resources toward domestic implementation of treaty rules. Inequality also helps unpack influence 
of wealth on a state’s reporting behavior, because measurements of wealth do not account for 
wealth disparities within a country. If a country has a high GDP per capita but the wealthiest 
individuals in society hold the majority of wealth, the country would face similar problems to 
those of poorer countries.  
 In the following section, I examine the average GINI index percentage of countries 
importing toxic waste and the category of reporting to which they belong. I divide reporting 
behavior into the same four categories as Chapter 3. First, “good reporters” are countries that 
submit reports in excel format, self-report either more than or within 10% percent difference of 
                                                
73 Neumayer, E., Gates, S., & Gleditsch, N.P. (2002). “Environmental commitment, democracy and 
inequality: a background paper to the World Development Report 2003.” World development report 
background papers. Washington D.C., World Bank. 36.  
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what is reported in export reports, or that submit reports with missing import information, but 
exporting countries do not report sending to them. “Memo-reporters” do not submit import 
amounts, but instead write a memo describing imports. “Non-reporters” never submit reports. 
Finally, “false reporters” either under-report their imports or do not submit import amounts and 
exporting countries report sending waste to them.  
 In the next section, I limit my focus to reporting behavior within developing countries. 
Industrialized countries are better off generally than developing countries, and inequality is not 
as much of a concern within these countries.  
Inequality and Reporting 
 
 
Figure 1: Inequality and reporting behavior in developing countries.  
 
 Within developing countries, average inequality varies slightly among reporting 
categories. The countries that submit memos instead of reports or that never submit reports are 
the most unequal of the categories on average by a slight margin. This trend mirrors the trend in 
which the poorest countries submit memos or never report, which seems to support the 
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suggestion that these countries do not have the capacity to implement reporting systems. Unequal 
countries thus seem to face similar capacity issues to poor countries.  
Amount of Toxic Waste Imports 
 Inequality may not only influence reporting behavior of states, but it may also influence 
the amount of toxic waste that countries import. Countries with higher levels of inequality often 
have more environmental degradation generally, and there are reasons to believe that inequality 
plays a role.77 A potential explanation is that the power associated with income in a highly 
unequal society indirectly leads to environmental degradation. 78 This theory rests on the 
assumption that those in power in society are also the wealthiest, and they receive the most 
benefits of environmentally degrading behavior. 79  If this is true, we might expect countries with 
higher levels of inequality to import more toxic waste.  
 In the following section, I look at a country’s GINI index percentage and compare it to 
the the log transformed amount of toxic waste that we know states are actually receiving, which 
is calculated in Chapter 2. This graph compares the amount of toxic waste that countries receive 
measured in tonnes on a log scale of 10 to the GINI index estimate as a percentage of what a 
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Inequality and Toxic Waste Imports 
 
Figure 2: Inequality and Toxic Waste Imports in all countries.  
 
 The data suggests that as countries become more equal, they import more toxic waste. 
Looking at only developing countries, we can examine potential relationships further or 
determine if countries that are poorer overall show any relationships.  
 
Figure 2b: Inequality and Toxic Waste Imports in Developing Countries.  
 
There seems to be a slight trend towards increased waste imports among countries with 
greater income equality, suggesting that developing countries dispose of toxic waste in a manner 
that does not disproportionately harm the poorest members of unequal countries. This is great 
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decades. 80 Fortunately, it does not seem to unfairly burden poor individuals living in highly 
unequal countries by exposing them to toxic waste. 
Conclusions 
This chapter suggests that income inequality does not substantially influence reporting 
behavior to the Basel Convention. The slightly higher levels of inequality among non-reporters 
and memo reporters may reflect the lack of capacity of poor nations to establish reporting 
systems. This chapter also suggests that more equal countries are importing more toxic waste. 
The poorest members of unequal societies are thus unlikely to experience disproportionately 























                                                
80 Cushing, L. et al. (2015). “The Haves, the Have-Nots, and the Health of Everyone: The Relationship 
Between Social Inequality and Environmental Quality.” The Annual Review of Public Health.  
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Chapter 5: Democracy 
 The political climate of a country could play an important role in in its commitment to 
implement the Basel Convention and adherence to the rules. By observing how democracy 
influences reporting behavior in the Basel Convention, we may see whether it influences 
willingness to report to the secretariat and report accurately. Democratic countries tend to fully 
engage with international agreements, so there is reason to expect that democratic members of 
the Basel Convention will be the best participants.  
 A country’s level of democracy may also influence its decision to import toxic waste. 
Depending on the public interests of a country, democracy may either endorse or deter countries 
from importing toxic waste. Because democracies promote free speech and represent the 
interests of society, the decision to import toxic waste should reflect the interests of society. 
Some democracies may know the danger of toxic wastes, and thus environmental groups in these 
countries may organize and put pressure on the government to refuse toxic waste imports. In 
other democratic countries, constituencies may encourage the government to import toxic waste 
as a form of economic development, if that is a priority of the country. It is important to note that 
democracies do not exist in a vacuum. Many democracies favor free-market economies, which 
allow interest groups to push their political agenda.  
Operationalization 
 I use the democracy index, developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit, as a proxy 
measure of democracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s democracy index is based on five 
categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, 
political participation, and political culture. These categories aim to provide an inclusive and 
wide measure of democracy to fully reflect how substantive a country’s democracy for almost 
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the world’s entire population.81 Expert assessments and public opinion surveys determine scores 
for over 60 indicators within the five categories, resulting in the final overall score. In this study, 
I used democracy index measurements from a 2015 report. Each country receives an overall 
score between 0 and 10 based on a compilation of scores for each category, with 0 being the least 
democratic and 10 being the most democratic. Overall, 19 Basel Convention members are 
missing democracy index measurements. The Economic Intelligence Unit does not measure the 
democracy index for microstates, the majority of Basel Convention members missing from the 
data sets.  
Reporting 
 Participation in international environmental agreements is political, and the political 
climate of a country could influence its participation in an agreement. In a 2002 study, 
researchers conducted a cross-country analysis and found not only that democracies participated 
in more international environmental agreements, but also that they complied better with 
reporting requirements.82  
 Democracy may influence a state’s willingness to comply with requirements of 
international environmental agreements because the institutions and ideas associated with 
democracy are more conducive to participation in international conventions. Democracies tend to 
be more transparent globally because information flows openly in these societies, so they would 
likely be more comfortable sharing information in reports. More authoritarian states are 
generally less willing to reveal internal information, which could be reflected in reporting 
behavior to the Basel Convention.83  
                                                
81 Kekic, L. (2007).“The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy.” The World in 2007.  82 Neumayer, Eric. “Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A 
Cross-Country Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 2. (2002). 139. 
83 Mitchell. 113.  
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 Democracies are also more transparent domestically, which allows domestic actors such 
as environmental groups to put pressure on the government to fulfill obligations to international 
environmental treaties. If a democratic country was slacking on reporting, then environmental 
groups within that country could follow up. This type of process is highly unlikely in 
authoritarian countries. Democracies also tend to respect the rule of law,84 which would likely 
translate to a respect for the legal obligations established by the Basel Convention. Democratic 
countries thus should be expected to report consistently and honestly.  
 In the following section, I look at the average democracy index of countries that fall 
within three reporting categories. These categories resemble the categories from Chapter 3 and 4, 
but memo reporters have been added to the “good reporting” group. In the earlier chapters, the 
memo group was a distinct category to consider the capacity of states in reporting behavior, but 
this category of reporting is not relevant for democracy. 
Democracy and Reporting Behavior 
  
Figure 1a: Democracy and reporting behavior in industrialized countries.  
 
 Within industrialized countries there is no clear pattern between level of democracy and 
reporting behavior. The only industrialized country that never reported to the Basel Convention 
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Secretariat is Iceland, which has a staggeringly high score of democracy. Because Iceland is the 
only case of non-reporting, there cannot be much interpretation for this behavior. Interestingly, 
good reporters and false reporters have the same democracy index on average. This suggests that 
democracy may not play an important role in reporting accuracy.  
   
Figure 1b: Democracy and reporting behavior in developing countries.  
 
 Within developing countries, the countries that report accurately to the Basel Convention 
have the highest average democracy index. Non-reporters are the least democratic on average 
than other reporting groups, which is not surprising. The average democracy of accurate 
reporters is slightly higher than false reporters, but the good reporters on average are over a 5 on 
the democracy index scale, which surpasses the mid-way point on the democracy index. False 
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Amount of Toxic Waste Imported  
 Democracy may influence the amount of toxic waste that a state imports. Scholars have 
disagreed on democracy’s influence on environmental quality for over forty years, and two 
opposing viewpoints remain contested in environmental literature. 85 The first wave of literature 
emerged in the late 1960s, and focused on the relationship between democracy, free markets, and 
the environmental degradation inherent in free markets.86 Later, scholars began to promote 
democracy’s role in improving environmental conditions after observing the prevalence of 
environmental degradation in the Soviet Union and countries ruled by dictators in Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa.87 A recent empirical study provided evidence supporting this relationship. In a 
sample of 143 countries, democracy reduced environmentally degrading human activities, such 
as carbon dioxide emissions, nitrogen oxide, organic pollution in water, deforestation, and land 
degradation.88  
 Conflicting views of democracy’s relationship with environmental quality rely on 
different potential pathways. The first pathway is that democracies provide optimal conditions 
for environmental groups, who work to improve environmental conditions.89 Democracies 
promote political rights, which allow environmental groups to organize and raise public 
awareness and action to address environmental problems.90 The second pathway is that 
                                                
85 Li, Q. & Reuveny, R. (2006). “Democracy and Environmental Degradation.”  
86 Ehrlich, P. R. (1968). The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine. Hardin, G. (1968). “Tragedy of 
commons.” Science,162.  
87 Pellegrini, L. & Gerlagh, R. (2006). Corruption, Democracy, and Environmental Policy: An Empirical 
Contribution to the Debate. McCloskey, H. J. (1983). Ecological Ethics and Politics. Totowa, 
NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Payne, R. A. (1995). “Freedom and the environment.” Journal of 
Democracy,6,3. 
88 Li & Reuveny. 953.  
89 Schultz, C. & Crockett, T. (1990). “Economic Development, Democratization, and Environmental 
Protection in Eastern Europe.” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 18, 1. Payne.  
90 Li & Reuveny.  
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democracies tend to respond to public environmental needs because politicians are elected, so 
power is more evenly distributed throughout society.91   
 Despite the alignment in democratic attitudes and international environmental 
conventions, some scholars suggest that democracy may reduce a state’s willingness to address 
environmental issues. Democracies tend to be market economies,92 in which business interest 
groups influence political decision-making and help set norms on which issues the government 
should address.93 Democratic leaders often rely on corporate interests to finance their campaigns. 
Interest groups prioritize maximizing profit, which often neglects environmental quality and the 
larger interests of society.94 Literature suggesting the connection between democracy and 
corporate interests first emerged in 198795 and continues to support this connection.96  
 An examination of the relationship between democracy and a member state’s imports of 
toxic waste provides empirical evidence to the debate in this literature, which has primarily 
focused on democracy’s influence on environmental degradation in the form of greenhouse gas 
emissions, water and air pollution, deforestation, and land degradation.97 Additionally, this 
analysis may also provide additional insight to how democracy may function differently in 
developing countries. In democratic developing countries, politicians must appeal to agrarian 
constituencies that may have reduced discount rates and who do not prioritize environmental 
                                                
91 Kotov, V. & Nikitina, E. (1995). "Russia and international environmental cooperation." Green globe 
yearbook of international cooperation on environment and development.  
92 Sato, S. (2000). “Democracy and Market Economy.” Asia Pacific Review, 7, 1.  
93 Li & Reuveny. 938. 
94 Dryzek, J. (1987) Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. Oxford: Blackwell 
95 Dryzek.  
96 Dinan, W. and Miller, D. (2007) Thinker, Faker, Spinner, Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on 
Democracy. Pluto Press. Deetz, S. (1992). Democracy in an Age of Corporate Colonialization: 
Developments in Communication and the Politics of Daily Life. State University of New York Press. Ray, 
D. (2005). “Corporate Boards and Corporate Democracy.” The Journal of Corporate Citizenship. Issue 
20. 93. 
97 Midlarskey, M.I. (1998). “Democracy and the Environment: An Empirical Assessment.” Journal of 
Peace Research, 35, 3. Li and Reuveny.  
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protection, which would in turn lead to reduced environmental quality.98 For example, Brazil is a 
democracy, yet deforestation rates continue to increase in Brazil. 99 Developing countries are the 
primary focus of this study. The role that democracy can play in supporting short-term needs of 
the greater society may influence a developing country’s decision to import toxic waste.   
 In the following section, I compare the amount of toxic waste that countries are actually 
importing, as calculated in Chapter 2, and the level of democracy within those countries. Each 
country receives an overall score between 0 and 10, with 0 being the least democratic and 10 
being the most democratic. 
Democracy and Toxic Waste Imports 
               
         Figure 2a: Democracy and toxic waste imports in industrialized countries. 
 
             Within industrialized countries, there appears to be a slight relationship between 
democracy and toxic waste imports. This suggests that industrialized democratic countries 
import the most toxic waste, which is good news from an environmental justice perspective. The 
countries that should be importing toxic waste according to the Basel Convention are doing just 
that.  
                                                
98 Midlarskey, 358.  
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             Figure 2b: Democracy and Toxic Waste Imports in Developing Countries 
 
 Within developing countries, there appears to be no relationship between democracy and 
amount of toxic waste imported in developing countries. However, two less democratic 
developing countries import the largest amounts of toxic waste. These two countries are 
Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation.  
Conclusions 
 It is reassuring that for the most part, states that import the most toxic waste are not doing 
it for problematic reasons. Democratic industrialized nations tend to import the most toxic waste. 
Negotiations leading up to the Basel Convention is established the norm that industrialized 
countries should import the most toxic waste. Within developing countries, democracy is not 
associated with toxic waste imports. However, two notable outliers are worth mentioning 
because the least democratic developing countries import the largest amounts of toxic waste. 
These authoritarian governments accept the largest amounts of toxic waste. As developing 
countries, they likely lack the infrastructure to safely process the waste, which puts societies 
within these countries at risk to environmental harms without the freedom to advocate for 
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 Within developing countries, non-reporting countries are the least democratic on average. 
Authoritarian countries are less open to information sharing generally, so they may be less 
willing to reveal toxic waste import information.  
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Chapter 6: Corruption 
 It is possible that states might not uphold requirements of the Basel Convention because 
of corruption. Corruption has been defined as “an act in which the power of public office is used 
for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules.”100  These countries tend to operate 
without regard to the rules in order to serve their best interests. Corruption may influence 
participation in the Basel Convention, in which states could fail to uphold reporting requirements 
if it is not beneficial. Corrupt countries have been cited as a destination of pollution,101 thus it is 
possible that more corrupt countries would import more polluting toxic wastes.  
Operationalization 
 In order to measure corruption’s influence in reporting behavior, I look at a country’s 
corruption perception index (CPI), a measure developed by Transparency International, a non-
governmental organization dedicated to addressing corruption. A number of studies examining 
corruption’s influence in policy have used the CPI to measure corruption.102 The corruption 
perception index is based on perception of the public sector’s involvement in corruption. 
Transparency International uses polls and data from a variety of reputable institutions and global 
experts within in the evaluated countries.103 The CPI is a score between 0 and 100, with zero 
being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean. In this study, I look at a 2015 report listing 
various countries’ CPIs. Not all countries’ democracy indices were measured in 2015, so I used 
data as far back as 2008 to fill in the gaps of information. Eleven Basel Convention members 
remain missing from the available data because transparency international’s corruption 
perceptions index excludes some microstates.  
                                                
100 Aidt, T. S. (2003). “Economic Analysis of Corruption: a survey.” Economic Journal, 113. 
101 Cole, Matthew. (2007). “Corruption, income and the environment.” Ecological Economies, 62, 3-4. 
102 Pellegrini, L. & Gerlagh, R. Lambsdorff, J. G. (1999). “Corruption in Empirical Research.” 
Washington D.C.: World Bank.  
103 “Transparency International.” (N.d.).Web.  
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Reporting  
 More corrupt countries may report inaccurately or fail to submit reports to the Basel 
Convention to serve their own interests. Countries that engage in this type of reporting behavior 
would qualify as “intentional violators” because they may have the capacity to report or report 
honestly, but fail to uphold reporting obligations for other reasons that serve their self-interest. 
All members of the Basel Convention signed onto this commitment under the common belief 
that increased transparency from reporting would allow a safer international trade system of 
toxic waste.104 While establishing this system improves global safety for all, some members may 
be tempted to “free ride” this agreement, meaning that they maximize their self-interest by 
participating in an international environmental treaty on paper while failing to uphold 
requirements in practice by providing false information or failing to report.105  
 In the following section, I look at the average CPI for countries that fall within three 
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Corruption and Reporting Behavior 
  
Figure 1a: Corruption and reporting behavior in industrialized countries (Iceland is the only non-
reporter) 
 Corruption does not seem to influence reporting accuracy within industrialized countries. 
Interestingly, good reporters have the highest average level of corruption. The non-reporting 
section is marked with an asterisk because Iceland is the only industrialized country in the Basel 
Convention that never submitted reports and has a relatively clean CPI index. False reporters are 
on average less corrupt than good reporters. It is likely that industrialized countries under-report 
accidentally, since they are the members of Basel that are supposed to import the most toxic 
waste. These states may be “good faith non-conformers,” meaning that they accidentally submit 
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Figure 1b: Corruption and reporting behavior in developing countries.  
 
 Within developing countries, corruption seems to play a role in non-reporting. Non-
reporting countries are more corrupt on average than countries that submit reports, even reports 
that are not accurate. Corruption does not seem to influence reporting accuracy, as accurate 
reporters and false reporters are at about the same level of corruption. Corrupt countries may not 
implement reporting systems within their governments because these systems are costly. It could 
be that these countries participate in the Basel Convention more symbolically, rather than with 
the intention to implement treaty requirements.  
Amount of Toxic Waste Imported 
 Corruption could influence how much toxic waste a state imports, especially because 
more corrupt countries tend to house more pollution generally. An empirical study found that 
corruption positively associated with two major air pollutants: sulfur dioxide and carbon 
dioxide.106 Other empirical studies indicate that corruption coupled with foreign direct 
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investment can create “pollution havens” or countries with high levels of pollution and few 
environmental regulations.107  
 Corruption may lead to environmental degradation through two possible pathways.  
Corruption could cause environmental degradation through direct bribes to the government to 
skirt around regulatory environmental standards. Theoretical literature suggests a connection 
between corruption and less strict implementation of environmental regulations.108 In an 
empirical study, a model based on data collected from ninety-four countries measured the direct 
impact of corruption on carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide emissions, controlling for corruption’s 
impact on income. 109  Results from this model support the literature suggesting that corruption’s 
influence on the environment operates through relaxed enforcement of environmental 
regulations. 110 Corruption may operate similarly in the toxic waste trade, in which corrupt 
governments would be less likely to implement legal obligations of the Basel Convention, such 
as submitting accurate reports.  
 Finally, corrupt governments generally do not represent the interests of their society. The 
turning point in environmental degradation in an EKC assumes first, that the government will 
take action to improve environmental conditions, and second, that government policy reflects 
societal preferences.111 A corrupt government generally does not represent the interests of 
society, thus in corrupt countries we would expect that an EKC turnaround is less likely to occur 
                                                
107 Cole, M. A., Elliott, R. R. and Fredriksson, P. G. (2006), “Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI 
Influence Environmental Regulations?” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108. 157–178. 
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Policy Formation: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 46, 3. 
490–512. H. Welsch. (2004). “Corruption, growth and the environment: a cross-country analysis.” 
Environment and Development Economics, 9. Pellegrini, L. & Gerlagh, R.  
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when income per capita increases. Higher levels of corruption could result in reduced 
governmental action to represent the interests of its society by importing toxic waste, even if it is 
detrimental to the health of society.  
 In the following section, I look at the average amount of toxic waste that states actually 
import as calculated in Chapter 2 in relation to three different corruption ranges determined by a 
country’s CPI. Very corrupt states range between 0-33 CPI. Moderately corrupt states fall 
between 34-66 CPI, and states with low corruption range between 67-100.  
Corruption and Toxic Waste Imports 
 
Figure 2: Corruption and Toxic Waste Imports in all Basel Convention members 
 
 Overall, it appears that the least corrupt countries import the most toxic waste of all 
countries in the Basel Convention. In order to get a better idea of what is going on within these 
countries, it is valuable to look at the trend within both industrialized countries and within 
developing countries.  
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Table 2a: Corruption and Toxic Waste Imports in Industrialized Countries 
 
 In industrialized countries, countries with low corruption import the most toxic waste as a 
whole. Industrialized countries are the most appropriate destination for toxic waste to be 
disposed because they house the most advanced technology to safely process toxic waste and the 
level of wealth to be able to prolong safe disposal. In negotiations of Basel, states agreed that 
industrialized countries should be importing the most waste. Thus, it is reassuring that the least 
corrupt industrialized countries are importing toxic waste. These countries are the least corrupt 
and uphold the norm set by the Basel Convention to import toxic waste as industrialized 
countries. 
 Although the averages are helpful to look at larger trends, an exception country is lost in 
this form of analysis. It is important to note that Mexico does not align with the larger corruption 
and toxic waste import trend among industrialized countries. Mexico imports the most toxic 
waste of any single country in the Basel Convention and is the most corrupt industrialized 
country, with a score of 35. Mexico is technically a member if the OECD, but it is an emerging 
economy and is not as industrialized as other groups. If Mexico is importing so much toxic 
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waste, we want to be confident that it is safely disposing of it, and governmental corruption 
levels are not reassuring on that front. 
  
Table 2b: Corruption and Toxic Waste Imports in Developing Countries  
 
 The story in developing countries is the exact opposite. Very corrupt countries are 
importing the most toxic waste on average among developing countries.  This suggests that 
corruption help explain why poorer countries import more toxic waste. Whoever has the power 
to make decisions about toxic waste imports in these countries likely benefits from the financial 
gain of toxic waste imports, even though developing countries generally are not well equipped to 
safely process toxic waste. When developing countries import toxic waste, they put their society 
at risk of exposure.  
Conclusions 
 Corruption does not substantially influence the reporting behavior of industrialized 
countries. But within developing countries, corruption raises a number of concerns. Highly 
corrupt developing countries are the least likely to submit reports to the Basel Convention, which 
hinders establishing transparency within the global toxic waste trade. In order to regulate the 
toxic waste trade and avoid inequitable trade, we must first know where waste is going and who 
	  253,184	  	  
	  41,841	  	   	  2,587	  	  	  -­‐	  	  	  	  	  50,000	  	  
	  100,000	  	  	  150,000	  	  
	  200,000	  	  	  250,000	  	  
	  300,000	  	  




















Average Toxic Waste Imports Among Developing 
Countries with Corruption Rating 
	   77 
is accepting it, which reporting tells us. This study suggests that corruption may influence a 
developing country’s decision to import toxic waste. Because corrupt governments generally do 
not represent the needs of society, we may be concerned that the developing countries that are 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
 In the past 30 years, the world has seen vast improvement in the global toxic waste trade. 
The Basel Convention and the Bamako Convention have both contributed to the elimination of 
the worst forms of toxic waste disposal in developing countries, and the majority of countries 
that do import toxic waste are egalitarian industrialized countries. Yet, some limitations in 
transparency remain, especially within developing countries. Reporting systems and reporting 
accuracy are much lower in developing countries, which prohibits the level of accountability 
necessary to promote the safest possible disposal of toxic waste. Of the developing countries that 
do import toxic waste, we may be especially concerned. Not only do developing countries lack 
the infrastructure needed to safely dispose of toxic waste, but also the governments of 
developing countries that do decide to import toxic waste are among the most corrupt. This 
leaves us with the knowledge that although conditions have improved overall, there is still much 
work to be done to prevent the world’s most vulnerable societies from toxic waste exposure.  
 Reporting is an essential component of regulating the toxic waste trade and establishing 
transparency. An analysis of reporting within the Basel Convention provides an idea of how the 
Basel Convention as a whole is doing. In this study, I find that reporting to the Basel Convention 
is not very good, especially by developing countries. Some countries never report to the Basel 
Convention. Most countries that never reporter do not import large amounts of toxic waste, with 
the exception of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which imported over 10,000 tonnes 
of toxic waste. About one third of Basel Convention members submit import reports but exclude 
import amounts in the report. Most of these countries did not import toxic waste, but the 
Republic of Korea imported over 150,000 tonnes without reporting this information in its import 
reports. The majority of countries that submit memos to the Basel Convention secretariat rather 
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than specific import amounts do not import toxic waste, but three of these countries import 
moderate amounts of toxic waste while claiming not to import toxic waste. These countries are 
China, Morocco, and Turkey. Generally countries that do not report to the secretariat or that 
submit incomplete reports do not import toxic waste and do not substantially reduce 
transparency, but the exception countries import substantial amounts of toxic waste without 
reporting it, which hinders transparency within the global toxic waste trade.  
 After examining the conditions that lead to consistent and accurate reporting, I find that 
country level wealth, inequality, democracy, and corruption are all associated with reporting 
behavior in varying degrees in both industrialized and developing countries. Some of these 
conditions may help explain the conditions under which a state reports and reports accurately to 
the Basel Convention secretariat.  
 The wealthiest countries are the most likely to report, and report accurately, to the Basel 
Convention. Countries that never report to the Basel Convention are on average much poorer 
than other members of the Basel Convention. Similarly, the next poorest countries submit reports 
in a simplified format. Instead of submitting detailed import information, these countries write a 
memo to the secretariat. Countries that under report their imports to the Basel Convention 
secretariat are also less wealthy on average than the countries that submit accurate reports. These 
reporting behaviors suggest that wealth is an important condition for states to implement toxic 
waste reporting systems. Without as many resources or existing infrastructure, less wealthy 
countries may have limited capacity to establish high quality reporting systems that can 
accurately monitor toxic waste imports.  
 The most equal countries on average are the most likely to report to the Basel 
Convention. Conversely, countries that never report or submit memos are the most unequal on 
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average. Countries that under report are only slightly more unequal on average than countries 
that submit accurate reports. This pattern suggests that unequal countries face the similar 
capacity issues as poor countries in establishing a reporting system. Without the means to 
develop a quality reporting system, it is understandable that these countries are less likely to 
submit reports or report accurately.  
 Democratic states are the most likely to submit reports and report accurately to the Basel 
convention. States that submit reports and report accurately are on average more democratic than 
other developing countries. It is not surprising that democracies would report well, since 
democratic countries generally respect the rule of law. Countries that never report to the Basel 
Convention are much less democratic on average. Authoritarian governments are generally less 
open to sharing information, thus it would not be usual for these actors to withhold information 
from the secretariat. 
 Less democratic states are also more likely to submit inaccurate reports. On average, 
states that under-report are less democratic than other Basel Convention members. It would not 
be surprising if an authoritarian government did not adhere to legal obligations to the Basel 
Convention, such as reporting accurately or reporting at all, because authoritarian countries 
generally respect the rule of law less than democracies. The reporting behavior of poor and 
unequal countries has suggested that it is costly to implement a toxic waste trade reporting 
system. If this is the case, those less committed to upholding treaty obligations are likely less 
willing to allocate resources to establish a costly toxic waste reporting system.  
 The least corrupt countries are the most likely to submit reports of Basel Convention 
members, and states that never submit reports are the most corrupt on average. Corrupt countries 
generally skirt around laws, so it is not surprising that the most corrupt countries do not report to 
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the convention. Interestingly, countries that under report are not more corrupt on average than 
countries that submit accurate reports. It could be that members of the Basel Convention that do 
not comply with obligations are less willing to implement a reporting system in the first place. 
There are no sanctions for developing countries that import toxic wastes, likely because the 
developing countries that lobbied for the Basel Convention were more concerned with unwanted 
toxic waste from exporting countries than voluntary imports.  
 Reporting behavior generally changes within different domestic contexts. Financial 
capacity appears to be at the root of why states are not reporting. Implementing a toxic waste 
reporting system is costly, as it involves bureaucratic staffing of borders and staffing of a 
competent authority. These costs likely dissuade poorer or unequal countries that lack the 
resources to implement a new system. Authoritarian and corrupt governments generally do not 
address environmental issues, thus it would not be surprising for these countries to negate the 
cost of establishing a new system.  
 Developing countries played a pivotal role in establishing the Basel Convention after a 
series of highly publicized cases of toxic waste dumping in the 1970s and 1980s. The Basel 
Convention was mainly created so that developing countries would no longer struggle with 
unwanted toxic waste dumping. Member countries also established an important norm during the 
negotiations of the Basel Convention. Because industrialized countries possess the most 
advanced technology to safely dispose of toxic waste without exposing individuals within those 
countries to harmful pollutants, they should import the most toxic waste. Despite this norm, 
importing toxic waste is potentially profitable for developing countries. Some environmental 
justice scholars argue that developing countries face disproportionate exposure to toxic waste 
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and may have reduced agency in the decision to import toxic waste.112 This thesis considers the 
question of what states take in the most toxic waste and in what context states decide to import 
toxic waste in an attempt to uncover whatever injustices may exist within the global toxic waste 
trade.  
 Fortunately, the most wealthy, democratic, low-corruption industrialized countries are the 
most likely members of the Basel Convention to import the most toxic waste. These countries are 
the safest sites of disposal because they possess the proper infrastructure to dispose of toxic 
waste and in general uphold the concerns of their own citizens and are less likely to 
disproportionately expose their citizens to environmental harms. Despite this general trend, some 
developing countries import toxic waste. Developing states are more likely to expose citizens to 
toxic waste even when importing small amounts compared to industrialized countries that import 
much more toxic waste due to differences in infrastructure. Thus, even the small amounts of 
toxic waste that developing countries import are important to consider. With the knowledge that 
some developing countries do import toxic waste, it is useful to understand the context in which 
these decisions are made.   
 There is no association between a developing country’s decision to import toxic waste 
and its level of wealth or inequality. This suggests that the developing countries that do import 
toxic waste are not doing so purely out of economic desperation. Developing countries face a 
good deal of economic hardship, so it would not be surprising if they imported toxic waste for 
the financial gain. Shortened time horizons often lead to harmful environment conditions that 
leave the world’s worse off even more vulnerable. Fortunately, developing countries seem less 
likely to consider importing toxic waste as a viable economic prospect. This is great news from 
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an environmental justice perspective because it suggests that the most poor and unequal 
countries are not willing to import toxic waste and expose their citizens to environmental harm.  
 Within developing countries there is no association between democracy and amount of 
toxic waste imported, but the developing countries that import the most toxic waste are also 
among the least democratic. These countries are the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan. This is 
concerning because they are developing countries that likely cannot process toxic waste in an 
environmentally sound manner to prevent citizens from exposure. Without democracy, citizens 
within these countries are much less likely to have environmental groups that can advocate for 
improved environmental conditions or elect politicians that can promise to improve the 
conditions within these countries.  
 The most corrupt developing countries are the most likely to import toxic waste. It is not 
surprising that the developing countries that import the most toxic waste on average are very 
corrupt. Although developing countries are the least equipped to safely dispose of toxic waste, 
corrupt governments generally do not represent the interests of their own societies and are less 
likely concerned for the health of their society. Corrupt governments are likely more willing to 
accept the risk of toxic waste exposure for their citizens in return for the financial gain.  
 Although the least corrupt industrialized countries are the most likely to import toxic 
waste, Mexico is an exception from this trend and is worth mentioning. Mexico is a member of 
the OECD, but it is also an emerging country and is far less likely than any other industrialized 
state to possess the infrastructure needed to safely dispose of toxic waste. The majority of the 
world’s toxic waste is sent to a relatively corrupt country with an emerging economy. Mexico is 
the most corrupt industrialized country and imports the most toxic waste of all Bamako 
Convention members, which is problematic from an environmental justice standpoint. As one of 
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the least wealthy OECD members, Mexico is likely the least fit to safely process toxic waste. As 
a more corrupt country, the government is also less likely to ensure the safest possible conditions 
of toxic waste disposal for its citizens.  
 Overall, many findings of this thesis are reassuring. The countries best fit for toxic waste 
disposal are the most likely to import toxic waste. Industrialized countries import the vast 
majority of toxic waste. The wealthiest, most equal, and most democratic industrialized countries 
import the most toxic waste. These characteristics set optimal conditions for safe toxic waste 
disposal. These countries likely have the most money to dispose of waste with the cleanest 
technology are the least likely to unfairly distribute environmental burdens throughout society.  
 Despite these reassuring findings, toxic waste imports in developing countries are 
concerning. When countries import toxic waste, we should be confident that they will dispose of 
it in a manner that reduces societal risks to exposure. The Basel Convention established that 
developing countries are not the best fit to import toxic waste, so the fact that developing 
countries are importing toxic waste at all is important. This concern coupled with fact that the 
developing countries that import the most toxic waste are generally not trustworthy suggests that 
the Basel Convention has more work to do.  
Recommendations for the Basel Convention 
 The Basel Convention was established to promote transparency in the global toxic waste 
trade in order to prevent unwanted and unauthorized toxic waste transport and disposal, 
especially within developing countries. The Basel Convention established a reporting system to 
implement this transparency. In theory, a reporting system increases accountability among 
countries because it provides information on who sends toxic waste and who accepts it. 113 This 
information then allows the convention to monitor whether member countries are upholding 
                                                
113 Chasek. 116. 
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obligations of the agreement and are disposing of toxic waste in an environmentally sound 
manner.  
 The Basel Convention has failed to hold its members accountable for two reasons. The 
secretariat collects the information necessary to analyze the state of the toxic waste trade because 
it collects information from both importing and exporting countries. Yet, the Basel Convention 
did not design a feedback system in which this information would monitor member behavior and 
provide feedback to or propose sanctions on Basel Convention members. Without applying the 
information that it collects, the Basel Convention does a weak job at promoting environmentally 
sound toxic waste disposal.  
 Additionally, the Basel Convention process does not provide adequate support to 
developing countries to establish reporting systems. A lack of financial capacity to implement 
reporting systems is at the core of why developing countries do not submit reports to the 
secretariat. Without toxic waste import information on developing countries, it is difficult to do 
what the Basel Convention sought out to do, which is to protect developing countries from 
unsafe and unwanted toxic waste imports by establishing transparency. Developing countries too 
are more likely to lack the infrastructure to implement secure customs at borders, which leaves 
them more vulnerable to toxic waste trafficking.  
 Although the Basel Convention promotes technical assistance to developing countries, 
funding mechanisms are limited to follow up with these provisions, especially amid widespread 
need from developing countries.114 The Basel Convention Trust Fund to Assist Developing 
Countries and Other Countries in Need of Technical Assistance in the Implementation of the 
Basel Convention is an entirely voluntary fund,115 which is not an ideal situation. The 
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widespread non-reporting and reports missing import information among developing countries 
suggest that poor members of the Basel Convention have not implemented reporting systems, 
even though the Basel Convention was ratified about 30 years ago. The fund established for 
assistance is unpredictable and many countries that do not report today lack financial support and 
likely cannot report due to a lack of capacity.   
Recommendations for International Environmental Law 
  The shortcomings of the Basel Convention have broad implications for international 
environmental law. The Basel Convention is a high-profile international environmental 
agreement among many in which member countries do not uphold reporting requirements. 
Understanding why states comply is a major question among international environmental law 
scholars who want to know what leads to state compliance within international environmental 
agreements. This has lead to two major schools of thought, which are the managerial model of 
compliance and the enforcement model of compliance.  
 The lack of capacity in developing countries supports the managerial model, which 
suggests that states do not comply with obligations of international environmental agreements 
because of a lack of capacity, not because of intentional deviance. In the case of the Basel 
Convention, evidence supports the conclusion that states fail to report largely because a lack of 
financial capacity to implement a reporting system. If that perspective is broadly representative 
across international environmental agreements, it suggests that international environmental 
agreements should account for capacity when establishing obligations and offer substantial 
support for domestic implementation within developing countries.  
                                                                                                                                                       
legal and institutional feasibility of appropriate and predictable financial mechanisms of the Basel 
Convention.” Open-ended Working Group of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
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 To some degree, reporting accuracy within the Basel Convention may reflect both aspects 
of the managerial model and the enforcement model of compliance. Members of the Basel 
Convention that submit reports with false information are slightly less wealthy on average than 
states that submit accurate reports. This suggests that states may not have the capacity to report 
accurately, especially if customs at borders are much less organized in developing countries. 
There is no difference in equality of developing states the report accurately and states that submit 
reports with false information, which suggests that states that do report inaccurately do in fact 
have the capacity to report with more accurate information. The enforcement model then may 
also apply to reporting behavior. Some countries may have the resources to implement an 
accurate reporting system but chose to submit purposefully deceiving information.  
 The enforcement model may be more applicable to a developing country’s decision to 
import toxic waste. The most corrupt developing countries import toxic waste despite the Basel 
Convention norm that developing countries should not be the final site of disposal for toxic 
waste. Corrupt developing countries may be behaving in a manner described by rationalist 
scholars, who believe that countries will only uphold international agreement obligations in order 
to suit their own needs. These corrupt governments import toxic waste even though their 
countries do not have as suitable of infrastructure to safely process it.  
 Within the context of the compliance question, it seems as though a blend of the 
managerial perspective and the enforcement perspective results in the best understanding of why 
states comply with international agreements. There are tradeoffs to compliance, especially when 
some countries lack fundamental infrastructure to domestically implement agreements.  
 The current state of the global toxic waste trade holds many implications for 
environmental justice and international environmental law. Despite the fact that industrialized 
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countries import the most toxic waste, the Basel Convention could vastly improve conditions for 
developing countries. The limited technical assistance funding of the Basel Convention and 
prevalence of non-reporting among poor countries demonstrates that international environmental 
agreements must be more accommodating to the needs of developing countries. Without 
established reporting systems in developing countries, including secure customs at borders, 
developing countries face risks of unsafe toxic waste exposure. Developing countries lobbied the 
Basel Convention into existence and strongly advocated during negotiations of the agreement, 
yet limitations remained in the final draft of the agreement to support developing countries. 
There is a global power imbalance, and actors that participate in international environmental 
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